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Abstract
A key issue in the design of a legal system is the choice of the mechanism
aggregating preferences over the level of deterrence. While under Case law appel-
late judges’ biases offset one another at the cost of volatility of precedents, under
Statute law the Legislator chooses certain rules that are biased only when bribes
are accepted: i.e., when political institutions are weak and/or the preference hetero-
geneity is sufficiently high. Thus, only in the last scenario, Case law can outperform
Statute law. Also, institutions fostering limited discretion by lower courts improve
the performance of Case law. Instrumental variables estimates based on historical
data from 156 countries confirm this prediction.
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“A legal tradition [. . . ] is not a set of rules of law [. . . ] rather it is a set of deeply rooted, historically
conditioned attitudes about [. . . ] the proper organization and operation of a legal system. The legal
tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression” The Civil Law Tradition,
Merryman (1969), page 2.
I. Introduction
The laws and the institutions entrusted with their creation are deeply influenced, in
a great part of the world, by either the Civil or the Common law tradition. While the
latter originated in England and has, then, been transplanted through colonization into
England’s ex-colonies, the former has its roots in the Roman law and was exported by
Napoleon to continental European countries and by the latter to Latin America, Africa
and Asia. Structurally the two traditions operate in different ways: while Common law
recognizes a crucial role to precedents and allows more procedural discretion to lower
adjudicating courts, Civil law relies on legal codes and bright line adjudication rules.
Exploiting these differences and assuming that transplanted institutions remained in place
unaffected after independence, the “legal origins” project has provided evidence suggesting
that French and socialist Civil law countries display more inefficient governments and
courts, less secure investor rights and a stricter market regulation than Common law
countries do (see for a review La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, [2008]).
Yet, legal scholars have recently documented a great wave of convergence in such a
way that, for instance, countries where the Common law tradition was transplanted are
relying more heavily on statutes (see Zweigert and Ko¨tz, [1998]; Roe, [2004]). What is,
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therefore, the set of forces justifying, despite the above mentioned evidence in favor of
Common law, the existence of such dissimilar institutions and their evolution?
This paper lays out a theoretical framework for thinking about these issues, and ex-
plores its empirical implications using data on the history of the legal order of 156 countries
that received their initial legal tradition externally by a fairly exogenous transplantation
process—transplanted, therein. The model merges a recent body of research on endoge-
nous lobbying (Felli and Merlo, 2006) with a lively literature on judicial activism and
Case law (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007a and b; Fernandez and Ponzetto 2008a and b), and
studies a world of social groups separated by their cultural preference over the level of de-
terrence that laws impose. This society compares the welfare properties of two law-making
institutions. Under Case law appellate judges, randomly picked from the population and
bearing variable costs for overruling the precedent, choose the law. Under Statute law,
instead, the prevailing rule is selected by a Legislator who bargains with coalitions of
the social groups facing fixed collective action costs. While the Legislator selects certain
rules which are unbiased only if she refuses bribes, judicial biases balance one another
and induce the long run optimal rule at the cost of everlasting volatility. If the cultural
distance among groups is small, collective action costs discourage bribes and Statute law
outperforms Case law. Yet, as the cultural distance rises, the Legislator eventually accepts
bribes and statutes move away from the optimal rule the more the lower is the quality
of political process—i.e., democracy. In this case, there is a level of democracy below
which Case law prevails over Statute law. The intuition remains robust if I consider al-
ternatives to the basic assumptions on the functioning of the two institutions. Moreover,
rules allowing the use of limited discretion by lower adjudicating courts increase appellate
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judges’ overruling costs and make statutes volatile. Thus, a pure Common (Civil) law
tradition where Case (Statute) law is used along with discretion-enhancing (bright line)
adjudication rules endogenously arises.
To test the model’s predictions I have collected data tracking the evolution of the
legal system of a cross section of transplanted countries. I record whether Statute or
Case law was in place in the year of independence and in 2000 and four proxies for the
level of discretion in adjudication for the same two points in time. Consistent with the
model, in countries in which Civil law—Statute law and bright line adjudication rules—
was transplanted, reforms toward Common law—Case law and flexible adjudication—are
more likely the weaker are the constraints on the executive and the broader is cultural
heterogeneity. Symmetrically moves toward Civil law in countries to which Common
law was imposed are found where the constraints on the executive are the strictest. I
measure cultural heterogeneity with both the genetic distance between the population
who chose the law-making rule and that of the transplanted country and the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization in the transplanted country. These results survive if I employ
an instrument suggested by evolutionary biology (cross-cultural psychology) to deal with
the endogeneity of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (constraints on the executive)
proxy. I also show that the likelihood of reforms toward Common law and the risk of
coercion by strong elites are positively related. This result casts doubts on the Glaeser
and Shleifer’s (2002) explanation of the rise of Common (Civil) law in England (France).1
The paper most closely related to mine is Fernandez and Ponzetto (2008a). Building on
1Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) study the trade-off between vulnerability of judges to private subversion and
the possible capture by the central power. In the 13th century, England was more peaceful than France
and it was optimal for the former (latter) to adopt adjudication by independent juries (state judges).
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similar adjudication microstructures, they also compare Statute law and Case law. They
obtain that judge-made law has the same reversion toward the optimal rule property. Yet,
the hypothesis that the set of coalitions bargaining with the Legislator is random produces
the result that statutes are unpredictable and eventually biased and so suboptimal with
respect to Case law in the long run. The assumption is not only empirically unreasonable
(see Wright, [1996]), but it also fails to highlight the role of preference heterogeneity and
its relation with adjudication institutions. Yet, this is a general drawback of the literature.
Indeed, although the comparative merits of Statute law and Case law have been debated
for centuries, the present paper constitutes the first attempt to link the welfare properties
of the two traditions to the cultural and political environment.2 Moreover, a major
contribution of my analysis is to provide a first empirical test of different theories justifying
the choice of the legal institutions typical of each tradition as the result of maximizing
behaviors. Finally, my results cast several doubts on the supposed primacy of Common
law stressed by the “legal origins” literature. To this extent, the new “legal origins”
project should consider the evolution of both law making and adjudication institutions
as driven by the dispersion of preferences and the quality of the political process, both of
which affect performances as well. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II identifies the extent of democracy and cultural heterogeneity conducive to
a primacy of either Statute law or Case law. Section III studies the relation between
law making and adjudication institutions. Section IV discusses the empirical results, and
section V concludes. The appendix gathers proofs and tables.
2Proponents of Statute law (Hobbes 1681; Bentham, 1891) stress the certainty of statutes; supporters of
Case law (Hayek, 1960; Cardozo, 1921; Posner, 2007) exalt the evolutionary properties of precedents.
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II. The Optimal Law-making Institution
Next, I will first introduce the analysis of the underlining regulation problem, which
takes its approach from Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007a); then, I will explain how it is per-
formed under Case law and Statute law. Finally, I will compare the two institutions.
The regulation problem: first and second best.—Consider a society composed by a contin-
uum of citizens whose mass is normalized to one. This society is interested in regulating
a harmful action affecting two parties: an offender O and a victim V . The former can
take precautions at a cost C. Precautions reduce the probability of an accident from pN
to pP = 0. The harm suffered by the victim is normalized to unity, and precautions are
socially optimal if and only if pN − pP = pN > C. The conditional probability of an
accident depends on the attributes a ∈ [0, 1] and u ∈ [0, 1] which are independently and
uniformly distributed in the population of cases. Assume that pN − pP = ∆P > C if
a + u ≥ 1 and pN − pP = ∆P < C if a + u < 1. Therefore, the offender should be held
liable whenever a+ u ≥ 1. The legal system has two tiers. In the lower tier adjudicating
courts observe only a and act as a perfect agent of the law-maker—to be relaxed in section
II.B. Damages are so high that they induce the offender to take precautions when she is
held liable; so, in the upper tier, the law-maker’s problem reduces to finding the optimal
level of a—call it A—such that lower courts hold the offender liable if and only if a ≥ A.
Imperfect information implies statistical errors, and the offender is mistakenly held
liable if a ≥ A∧a < 1−u, which happens with probability ∫ 1
A
(1− a) da = (1/2) (1− A)2,
and mistakenly held not liable if a < A ∧ a ≥ 1 − u which happens with probability∫ A
0
ada = (1/2)A2. Over (under) precautions bring the fixed marginal cost Λ¯ = C −∆P
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(Λ = ∆P − C); λ = Λ¯/Λ is the relative cost of a false positive or of over-precautions.
A world of biases.—The population is equally split in two groups i ∈ I = {L,H}. They
differ in the relative perceived cost of a false positive βi = βO,i/βV,i. If the groups have
different mass, the model’s features are similar but the algebra more cumbersome. The
preference intensity is normalized in order to have βO,i + βV,i = 1,∀i. The unconcerned
group has βL = λpi and the concerned one has βL = λpi. Accordingly, pi ∈ (1,∞)
represents a measure of cultural heterogeneity: i.e., the extent of disagreement about the
perceived danger of the action between citizens belonging to groups with different ethnic,
religious or political long-lasting tastes or ideologies.3 As a result, the loss of welfare
relative to the first best for a citizen belonging to group i is
Λi (A) = (1/2)
[
βO,i (1− A)2 + βV,iA2
]
, (1)
which can be fully characterized by group i’s favorite threshold Aˆi = βO,i = Γ (βi) with
Γ (x) ≡ x (1 + x)−1.4 The unconcerned group prefers the lenient AˆL = λpi (1 + λpi)−1 ≡ A¯
while the concerned one the stricter AˆH = λ (pi + λ)
−1 ≡ A. Thus, (1) rewrites as:
Λi (A) = (1/2)
[
Aˆi (1− A)2 +
(
1− Aˆi
)
A2
]
∝ (1/2)
(
A− Aˆi
)2
. (2)
Under rule A, the loss of social welfare—relative to the first best—is
3Running public good experiments on comparable participant pools around the world, Herrmann, Tho¨ni,
and Ga¨chter (2008) document the existence of large differences in individual willingness to punish free
riders and their relation with cultural biases. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) provide evidence compatible
with the idea that sentences respond to citizenry tastes for vengeance as driven by ethnic differences.
4The first best implies that in half of the cases precautions are not taken and the expected cost of accident
is ∆P and that, in the other half, precautions are optimally taken and the only cost is C.
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Λ˜ (A) = (1/2) [ΛL (A) + ΛH (A)] ∝ (1/2)
(
A− E
(
Aˆi
))2
, (3)
and the optimal threshold A˜ is equal to the mean of the Aˆi.
5 In evaluating the generality of
the foregoing, two observations should be borne in mind. First, the model applies not only
to tort law but to every conceivable legal branch as long as a is interpreted as the observed
between two dimensions proving the culpability of the defendant. In this case, the cost
of a false positive (negative) is given by the disutility from punishment—or the foregone
utility from acting—net of the expected harm (the opposite) measured when conviction is
suboptimal (optimal).6 Second, I can relax—see section II.B—the assumption according
to which all citizens are biased and the one according to which they do not care about
the technological efficiency of the law—i.e., the distance between A and A∗.
The timing.—The timing is as follows (see also Fernandez and Ponzetto [2008a]):
1. At the Constitutional table—t = 0—society chooses between Statute and Case law
comparing the expected long run losses of welfare under the two institutions;
2. A If Statute law has been chosen, the Legislator selects in t = 1 a rule AS at the
end of a bargaining game to be further discussed below. Then AS sticks forever.
B Under Case law an appellate judge randomly picked from the population selects
in t = 1 a Ac,1 which guides adjudication until another judge overrules it in t,
turning Ac,t−1 = Ac,1 into Ac,t, and possibly giving rise to a new round of changes.
5A˜ is weakly greater (strictly lower) than the technologically efficient A∗ = Γ (λ) for λ ≤ 1 ( λ > 1 )—see
the appendix. Without normalization, A˜ differs from both E
(
Aˆi
)
and A∗ for all λ 6= 1, and the lobbying
game described below has more equilibria. Yet, the main qualitative message of the model still holds.
6The set up also applies to those situations in which ex-ante contracting and ex-post observability lead to
conflicts on the optimal allocation: constitutional design, contracting and insurance (Gennaioli, 2008).
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II.A Statute Law versus Case Law
Let me start from the characterization of the equilibrium under Case law.
Case law.—Stare decisis only binds in so far as it is costly for judges to change the prece-
dent. A judge inheriting precedent Ac,t−1 and setting a Ac,t 6= Ac,t−1 can introduce any
change in the law. Yet, the need to justify his decision implies a persuasive effort whose
cost rises with the relevance of the doctrine of stare decisis K > 0—see the institutional
analysis at the end of section III—and the magnitude of the legal revision. This last detail
formalizes “the idea that the greater the effective deviation from precedent, the greater
the difficulty to reconcile it with the rhetorical demands of stare decisis” (Fernandez and
Ponzetto, 2008b). Judge i ’s strictly concave problem in t is:
Aˆc,t (i) = arg max
Ac,t(i)
− (1/2)
(
Ac,t (i)− Aˆi
)2
− (K/2)
(
Ac,t (i)− Aˆc,t−1
)2
.
A type i judge minimizes both the loss she bears as a part of group i when Ac,t dif-
fers from Aˆi and the one of justifying a Ac,t far from Ac,t−1. The unique and global
solution Aˆc,t = Γ (K)Ac,t−1 + [1− Γ (K)] Aˆi implies that Case law follows an auto-
regressive process converging to the ergodic distribution with mean E
(
Aˆi
)
and variance
V
(
Aˆc
)
= V
(
Aˆi
)
(1 + 2K)−1, where V
(
Aˆi
)
is the variance of the groups’ favorite rules
and Aˆc the long run judge-made law. The long run loss of social welfare is:
E
(
Λ˜
(
Aˆc
))
∝ (1/2) V
(
Aˆc
)
+ (1/2)
(
E
(
Aˆc
)
− A˜
)2
= V
(
Aˆi
)
[2 (1 + 2K)]−1.
As already stressed by Cardozo (1921), Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007b), and Ponzetto and
Fernandez (2008a, b), Case law assures long run unbiasedness at the cost of everlasting
volatility.7 Lemma 1 summarizes these results:
7Fernandez and Ponzetto (2008a) and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007b) clarify that this basic pattern survives
when the selection of disputed for litigation is endogenous (but see also Depoorter, Fon and Parisi, [2005])
or only a subset of adjudicated cases can possibly give rise to a precedent change.
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Lemma 1 (Proposition 5, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007b): Let u be unob-
servable. Case law evolves as a first-order autoregressive process which converges to the
ergodic distribution N
(
E
(
Aˆi
)
, V
(
Aˆi
)
(1 + 2K)−1
)
. The asymptotic variance V
(
Aˆc
)
rises (falls) with pi (K) and it is always strictly smaller than the variance of the judges’
bliss points V
(
Aˆi
)
for K > 0.
Statute law.—Dating back to the rise of the absolute monarchy, legislation has been in-
terpreted as the sovereign act of the legitimate political authority (Hobbes, 1681). This
conception became part of the common heritage of the Enlightenment and received its nor-
mative foundations from the establishment of modern democracies. Yet, legislation is the
outcome of a political process that involves also lobbies representing the special interests
of groups of citizens particularly affected by the law: as a consequence, statutes reflects
the society’s will the more accurately the stricter the constraints on the Legislator—the
government, the legislature and the president—are.
In order to capture at best such a complex interaction between political institutions
and ideological biases, I use the endogenous lobbying model proposed by Felli and Merlo
(2006): As is chosen by a Legislator who bargains with coalitions of the two groups,
and maximizes a weighted average of the loss of social welfare and bribes y—U (As, y) =
− (1− µ) Λ˜ (As)+µ |i| y, where µ has to be correctly considered as the relative weight that
the Legislator is constrained or prefer to place on special interests vis-a-vis the society’s
will (see also Acemoglu and Robinson, [2006]). The latter is inversely related to the
quality of the political process which, in turn, has been shown to be highly persistent and
mainly related to long lived cultural traits (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Tabellini, 2008; Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008): the component of democracy considered here is exactly
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this persistent one. The adjustment for the number of groups in the population takes
care of the mechanical bonus to democracy brought by a rise in |i|, and just simplifies the
algebra. The Legislator chooses the winning coalition who, in turn, has to pay a fixed non
sunk “collective action” (Olson, 1965) fee Ψ > 0 in order to transfer the bribes.8 These
two model’s features constitute the sense in which lobbying is endogenous, and avoid the
empirically unsatisfactory (Wright, 1996) menu-auction models’ assumption according to
which all lobbies participate to the policy-making (see Grossman and Helpman, [2001]). I
also maintain that the Legislator appropriates the entire willingness to pay of the winning
coalition: given the model’s focus on the ratio decidendi, the hypothesis is immaterial.
The lobbying game works as follows. Lobby i ∈ I = {L,H} has utility− (1/2) Λi (As)−
y, and can sign binding contracts with the Legislator over As in exchange for transfers y.
The Legislator has the option of not signing any contract and implementing the status
quo A˜. Let Ω = {{φ} , {L} , {H} , {L,H}} denotes the set of possible coalitions l. For
any As the Legislator may implement instead of A˜, l is willing to pay
Wl
(
As, A˜
)
=
∑
i∈l
wi
(
As, A˜
)
= (1/4)
∑
i∈l
[(
A˜− Aˆi
)2
−
(
As − Aˆi
)2]
−Ψ,
which is the sum of the maximum individual rational bribes of each lobby i ∈ l—
wi
(
As, A˜
)
—less the fixed fee. The Legislator, first, chooses an As for each l ∈ Ω
Aˆs (l) ∈ arg max
As
− (1− µ) Λ˜ (As) + µ |i|Wl
(
As, A˜
)
, (4)
and then she chooses her preferred bargaining coalition
8These are the costs of “establishing links with politicians, hiring professional lobbyists, building a com-
munications network [...], designing a scheme of punishments for defaulting members” (Mitra, 1999).
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lˆ ∈ arg max
l∈Ω
− (1− µ) Λ˜
(
Aˆs (l)
)
+ µ |i|Wl
(
Aˆs (l) , A˜
)
. (5)
Therefore, a subgame perfect equilibrium of the endogenous lobbying game is given by a
threshold function Aˆs (l), and a coalition lˆ. If the Legislator accepts bribes, the outcome
of the bargaining is a compromise between the socially optimal A˜ and the rules preferred
by the lobbies included in the winning coalition. Given the quadratic loss function, As
takes the form of a weighted average further away from A˜ the less democratic is society
and the higher is the cultural heterogeneity, and in particular:
Lemma 2.A: Let u be unobservable. For any coalition l ∈ Ω, there is a unique optimal
threshold As (ls) that solves problem (4):
Aˆs (l) =
[
(1− µ) A˜+ µ
∑
i∈l
Aˆi
]
(1− µ+ |l|µ)−1 , (6)
where |l| is the numerosity of coalition l.
Yet, the Legislator accepts bribes only if the polarization between groups is so wide that
the rewards from corruption overcome the losses of social welfare. In particular:
Lemma 2.B: Let u be unobservable. 1. There are two levels of heterogeneity pi and
pi, decreasing with µ and increasing with Ψ, such that: pi ≥ pi; for pi ≥ pi the Legisla-
tor is indifferent between {L} and {H}, and picks either Aˆs ({L}) = (1− µ) A˜ + µA¯ or
Aˆs ({H}) = (1− µ) A˜+µA, and for pi < pi the Legislator does not accept bribes; for pi ≥ pi,
{L} and {H} pay the fixed cost, and for pi < pi they don’t. Neither {L} nor {H} will pay
any fixed fee Ψ > Ψ¯ = 1/16. 2. As a consequence, for µ > 0 and Ψ ≤ Ψ¯, from t = 1 on
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the loss of social welfare equals 0 for pi < pi and (µ2/8)
(
A¯− A)2 for pi ≥ pi.9
Thus, the constraints on the Legislator’s actions cover a second role in the equilibrium.
Not only if side payments are paid, the equilibrium threshold is the nearer to the second
best A˜ the lower µ is, but also, in a more democratic society, the Legislator finds it less
appealing to be bribed—i.e., pi is increasing with the quality of the political process.
The optimal level of centralization.—The welfare comparison between the long run losses
of welfare driven by the two institutions is now straightforward. For K < ∞ Case law
can outperform Statute law only if the policy chosen by the Legislator is at least partially
biased by bribing—i.e., if pi ≥ p¯i—and
Λ˜
(
Aˆs
)
> E
(
Λ˜
(
Aˆc
))
↔ (µ2/8) (A¯− A)2 > (A¯− A)2 [8 (1 + 2K)]−1 ↔ µ2 > (1 + 2K)−1,
which leads directly to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Let u be unobservable. Statute law is always strictly better than Case
law for pi < p¯i and K < ∞ and the two institutions induce the same expected welfare for
pi < p¯i and K = ∞. For pi ≥ p¯i and every K, there is a µ¯ (K) with ∂µ¯ (K)/∂K < 0,
µ¯ (∞) = 0 and µ¯ (0) = 1, such that Statute law performs strictly better (weakly worse)
than Case law for every µ < µ¯ (K) (otherwise).10
The intuition for this result is immediate. Whenever bribes affect the equilibrium rule,
Statute law assures certainty at the cost of a biased rule. Case law, instead, achieves the
9Implicit in (4) and (5), there is the assumption that both side transfers and collective action costs do not
entail social wastes: relaxing it does not change the qualitative message of the model—see footnote 12.
Only the algebra (the interpretation) but not the qualitative message of lemma 2.B changes when the
fixed cost is per-group (is borne ex-ante before the Legislators moves).
10Such features stand if judges can be bribed. Provided that a sufficiently high weight is put on money,
judges accept bribes, Case-law remains unbiased and volatile, and the proposition’s idea survives. Also,
the Constitutional Table’s decision is collusion and renegotiation proof, being the losing group’s willing-
ness to pay for a reform of the optimal institution always lower than that of the winning group. Finally,
statutes become volatile but unbiased if selected in each period by a Legislator accepting bribes: yet, the
same inequality identifies the optimal institution. The proofs of these and all the robustness contained
in the following footnotes are available from the author upon request.
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socially optimal long run rule but at the cost of volatility.11 Both costs are a function of
the extent of disagreement between the groups—i.e., the distance
(
A¯− A)2. Therefore,
for pi ≥ p¯i, whether Case or Statute law prevail is only due to the comparison between
the overruling cost and the strength of democratic institutions. Given a less than infinite
institutional relevance of stare decisis, a society who better fares in assuring the probity
of her representatives will embrace Statute law.12 A fortiori, when the cultural distance
is small—pi < p¯i, Statute law always outperforms Case law.13
This pattern conflicts with the Fernandez and Ponzetto’s (2008a) claim that Case
law is evolutionary superior to Statute law. The deep reason is that they model Statute
law as a process of exogenous lobbying where the active ones are random. In this case,
statutes are volatile and eventually biased; in this scenario, the expected long run loss of
welfare is bigger than the one under Case law provided that democracy is imperfect and
stare decisis is sufficiently relevant. Yet, a similar set up not only comes very short in
explaining which coalition is willing to bargain with the Legislator but also what is the
role of cultural heterogeneity.
Next, I consider a series of extensions to the basic model. First, I characterize the
equilibrium of the lobbying game in a more articulated world where there is also a third
cultural group with unbiased preferences for A∗. Then, I explore whether the idea laid
11With fixed overruling costs—as in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007a), there is a pi∗ such that for pi ≤ pi∗ (for
pi > pi∗) the rule fixed by the first judge sticks forever (judges with opposite tastes overrule each other)
and the loss of welfare is (1/8)
(
A¯−A)2. In this scenario, Case law is always sub-optimal for K <∞.
12Costly lobbying only reinforces the main result, given that statutes become even less efficient when the
Legislator is bribed at a high level of heterogeneity and/or at relatively—to K—low level of democracy.
13When citizen-candidates run to become the Legislator, the section’s qualitative features stand, provided
that the winner is not too insulated from the opposing party—i.e., she puts a not too small weight on
her loss of welfare. The two candidates gather the same number of votes and have the same probability
of winning. Again statutes perform better if no bribe is paid or if µ is relatively small with respect to K.
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down in proposition 1 is upset if: 1. society trades off cultural biases with efficiency
concerns; 2. appellate judges are forward-looking or (3.) can introduce new relevant
information distinguishing the precedent. The message coming from these very different
exercises is that the main qualitative result of the model—i.e., for fixed K, relatively more
heterogeneous and/or less democratic societies should choose Case law—remains true.
II.B Robustness
Introducing an unbiased group.—The population is equally split among the unconcerned
group with βL = λpi, the concerned one with βH = λ/pi and a third unbiased group with
βE = λ. Again, the Legislator chooses an extremist coalition whenever pi is sufficiently
high. Yet, the presence of the unbiased group breaks the Legislator’s indifference and:
Lemma 3: Let u be unobservable. 1. For any l ∈ Ω, there exist a unique optimal
Aˆs (l) defined by (6). For λ ≤ 1 (λ > 1), the Legislator chooses {L} ({H}) and there
are levels of cultural heterogeneity p˜il˜ and
˜˜pil˜ for l˜ = {{L} , {H}} falling with µ and rising
with Ψ such that: ˜˜pil˜ ≥ p˜il˜; for pi ≥ ˜˜piL (pi ≥ ˜˜piH) the Legislator chooses {L} ({H}), and
for pi < ˜˜piL (pi < ˜˜piH), she selects A˜; for pi ≥ p˜iL, {L} (for pi ≥ p˜iH , {H}) pays Ψ, and for
pi < p˜iL (for pi < p˜iH) she does not. No coalition pays a fixed charge Ψ > Ψ˜ = 1/27. 2.
Thus, for µ > 0 and Ψ ≤ Ψ˜, from t = 1 on the loss of social welfare equals 0 for pi < ˜˜piL
(pi < ˜˜piH) and (µ
2/18)
(
A∗ + A− 2A¯)2 ((µ2/18) (A¯+ A∗ − 2A)2) for pi ≥ ˜˜piL and λ ≤ 1
(pi ≥ ˜˜piH and λ > 1).14
Thus, if A∗ is stricter than the second best, which happens for λ ≤ 1, the Legislator favors
{L}; when, instead, λ > 1 and so A˜ = E
(
Aˆi
)
< A∗, coalition {H} prevails. Again, the
14For λ = 1 the Legislator is supposed to incline for {L}. The hypothesis is without loss of generality.
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welfare comparison between the two institutions is immediate. When K < ∞ Case law
can outperform Statute law if and only if pi ≥ ˜˜pil˜ and:
Λ˜
(
Aˆs
)
> E
(
Λ˜
(
Aˆc
))
=
[
3
(
A¯
)2
+ 3 (A∗)2 + 3 (A)2 − (A¯+ A∗ + A)2] [18 (1 + 2K)]−1.
This last inequality leads directly to the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Let u be unobservable. Statute law is always strictly better than Case
law for pi < ˜˜pil˜ and K < ∞, and the two institutions induce the same expected welfare
for pi < ˜˜pil˜ and K = ∞. For pi ≥ ˜˜pil˜ and for every K, instead, there is a µ˜l˜ (K, pi) with
∂µ˜l˜/∂K < 0, ∂µ˜l˜/∂pi < 0, µ˜l˜ (∞, pi) = 0 and µ˜l˜
(
K¯l˜, pi
)
= 1 for K¯l˜ > 0, such that Statute
law performs better (weakly worse) than Case law for every µ < µ˜l˜ (otherwise).
Differently from proposition 1, cultural heterogeneity has also an intensive margin: as it
increases the autocracy threshold over which Case law outperforms Statute law. As a
consequence, the main model’s message remains true even for Ψ = 0. The rest of the
paper considers, for simplicity, the two groups case; however, all the results hold true also
when the unbiased group is introduced.
Accounting for tastes versus efficiency.—Let me now consider a world in which techno-
logical efficiency is weighted against preferences aggregation, in such a way that group
i’s losses are [(1− T )/2] Aˆi
(
1− AE)2 + [(1− T )/2](1− Aˆi) (AE)2 + (T/2) (AE − A∗)2
where T is the common relative technological concern in the efficiency—notice the apex
E—regime. Group i ’s bliss point is now (1− T ) Aˆi + TA∗. Consequently, ΛEi
(
AE
)
is
proportional to (1/2)
(
AE − AˆEi
)2
and the optimal second best rule is a compromise be-
tween each group’s bliss point and A∗. Under Case law, judge i’s objective function at
time t is − (1/2)
(
AE − AˆEi
)2
− (K/2) (AEc,t − AEc,t−1)2. The unique and global solution
is Γ (K)AEc,t−1 + [1− Γ (K)] AˆEi , and judge-made law follows an auto-regressive process
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converging to the ergodic distribution N
(
E
(
AˆEi
)
, V
(
Aˆi
)
(1− T )2 (1 + 2K)−1
)
. So the
loss of social welfare is proportional to (1− T )2 V
(
Aˆi
)
[2 (1 + 2K)]−1. The Legislator,
instead, selects AˆEs =
[
(1− µ) A˜E + µ∑i∈l AˆEi ] (1− µ+ |l|µ)−1 and the same patterns
described by lemma 2.B when A˜ and Aˆi are replaced by A˜
E and AˆEi respectively arise—see
appendix. For K <∞, Case law outperforms Statute law if only if pi ≥ p¯iE and
µ2 (1− T )2 (A¯− A)2 > (1 + 2K)−1 (1− T )2 (A¯− A)2 ↔ µ2 > (1 + 2K)−1.
Thus, proposition 1 applies unchanged, and the evolution of the legal system will again
be driven by the preference heterogeneity and the quality of the political process only,
provided that the population has the same relative concerns for technology. Thus, when
we look at the impact of legal institutions on economic outcomes, if the measure of devel-
opment we employ account for both tastes and technological efficiency, we should find no
significant difference among countries that have reached their preferred legal tradition—
i.e. that did not remain trapped due to high switching costs with the tradition that they
received with transplantation: see section IV.A below.15
Forward-looking judges.—As stressed by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007b), another source
of judicial moderation is given by the forward looking concerns of appellate judges. To
reduce the possibility of future overruling, appellate judges may choose to set a less biased
precedent today. Such concerns produce patterns similar to those illustrated in proposi-
tion 1 in the same environment studied by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007b). In particular,
let me assume that there are only two period, appellate judges discount the future by a
15Yet, the existing literature employ measures of development capturing the impact of the law on tech-
nological efficiency only—i.e., a function of
(
AE −A∗)2. In this case, at low level of pi Statute law
outperforms Case law because it produces rules that are certain and unbiased. If instead pi is sufficiently
high and only the long run bias of the law (both the long run bias of the law and her volatility) affects the
dimension studied—e.g. regulation of entry (creditor rights), Case (Statute) law is welfare maximizing
because unbiased (provided that the quality of institutions is sufficiently high because certain).
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factor δ ≤ 1 and bear a fixed cost of overruling equal to K˜. In the second period judge i
overrules the precedent replacing it with his desired rule when
(
Aˆc,1 − Aˆi
)2
> 2K˜. As a
result, if −i is the group with preference opposite to i, the first period judge maximizes:
− (1/2)
(
Ac,1 (i)− Aˆi
)2
− δ
[
(1/2)
(
Ac,2 (i)− Aˆi
)2
+ (1/2)
(
Ac,2 (−i)− Aˆi
)2]
,
where the dependence of second period rule from the identity of the second period appel-
late judge is made explicit. Forward-looking concerns can induce a first period compromise
that also a judge with similar preferences will overrule. The appendix shows that, under
mild regularities on K˜, this is the only equilibrium when pi is sufficiently high. Indeed:
Lemma 4: Let u be unobservable and K˜ < 1/8. 1. There exists pˆi, pˆi, ˆ¯pi such that:
pˆi < pˆi < ˆ¯pi; for pi < pˆi (pˆi < pi < ˆ¯pi) the first period judge selects Aˆc,1 = Aˆi which is
not (is) overruled (by a judge of type −i who chooses Aˆ−i); for pˆi ≤ pi ≤ pˆi (pi ≥ ˆ¯pi) a
type L judge selects A+
√
2K˜ and a type H selects A¯−
√
2K˜ which is not (is) overruled
(by a judge of type i who chooses Aˆi). 2. The second period loss of social welfare is
(1/8)
(
A¯− A)2 for pi < pˆi and pˆi < pi < ˆ¯pi, (1/2) [(1/2) (A¯− A)−√2K˜]2 for pˆi ≤ pi ≤ pˆi,
and (1/16)
(
A¯− A)2 + (1/4) [(1/2) (A¯− A)−√2K˜]2 for pi ≥ ˆ¯pi.
For pi ≥ p¯i, the second period loss of welfare under Statute law is (µ2/8)
(
A¯− A−
)2
and:
Proposition 3: Let u be unobservable and K˜ < 1/8. Statute law is weakly better than
Case law for pi < min
{
p¯i, pˆi
}
. For pi ≥ min{p¯i, pˆi}, there is a µˆ with ∂µˆ/∂K˜ ≥ 0 such that
Statute law outperforms (performs weakly worse than) Case law for µ < µˆ (otherwise).
Thus, even when appellate judges are forward-looking the model’s main result holds.
Distinguishing.—Stare decisis requires judges to abide by the holding of the first court,
but still allows them to distinguish the precedent by introducing a new dimension b into
consideration. “A judge can claim that the previous rule applies to an arbitrarily small
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portion of the infinitely larger space that he is now mapping: he thereby “reduces the
range of the binding ratio decidendi to a vanishing point” (Stone 1964).”
This ability to create “complex balancing tests based on marginal trade-offs between
different factors” (Fernandez and Ponzetto, 2008b) can be easily captured in the model
of section II.A supposing, as Fernandez and Ponzetto (2008b) do, that eventually the
second dimension u becomes observable and appellate judges can implement the optimal
two-dimensional rule B = 1−a at a fixed cost K˜I > 0—where I stands for information.16
In order to highlight in the clearest way the effect of this flexibility advantage of Case
law, I shut down overruling assuming that K = 0. Lemma 5 summarizes my findings:
Lemma 5: Let K = 0 and suppose that u becomes observable, then for K˜I < 1/2
there exists a piI increasing with K˜I such that for pi ≥ piI the optimal two-dimensional
rule B = 1− a is introduced, and the first best prevails thereafter.17
Conflicts and overruling persist so long as ignorance on u does; if the latter becomes ob-
servable all judges agree on the reduction at zero of the errors if the cultural heterogeneity
is sufficiently high to justify the payment of the fixed charge. As a consequence, again
the main model’s main feature stands. In point of fact:
Proposition 4: Let K = 0 and K˜I < 1/2, and suppose that u becomes observable,
for pi < piI (pi ≥ piI) Statute law outperforms Case law (the opposite is true).
16I obtain similar results when, as in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007a), distinguishing judges choose two levels
of b respecting the precedent in the sense that O is held liable if a < Aˆc and b ≥ B− or a ≥ Aˆc and b ≥ B¯.
17It is worth to notice that all the analysis holds true when appellate judges’ objective function is instead
−ΛEi
(
AEc,t
) − (K/2) (AEc,t −AEc,t−1)2. With these preferences, in order to have lemma 5 holding I also
need that K˜I is not too small in such a way that the judges’ willingness to pay K˜I is rising with pi.
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III. Rules versus Discretion in Adjudication
Scholars in comparative law (Merryman, 1969; Damas˘ka, 1986; Zweigert and Ko¨tz,
1998; Glendon, Gordon, and Carozza, 1999) see the reliance on broad principles rather
than specific “bright line” rules of adjudication, as a defining feature of the Common as
opposed to the Civil law tradition. In section II, I solved the model under the maintained
assumption that bright line rules of adjudication were always in place—i.e., assuming that
the rule selected by the law-maker is strictly respected by lower adjudicating courts. In
general, instead, under more flexible principles of adjudication—discretion hereafter, lower
courts have the right to adjudicate a case according to a ratio-decidendi different from the
one chosen by the law-maker by, for instance, manipulating the evidence (Gennaioli and
Shleifer, 2008). In this section, I show that this procedurally accepted form of discretion
emerges as an efficiency attempt to blunt the losses driven by the volatility of Case law.
I consider a mild form of discretion. Bearing a cost θ > (α/2)
(
A¯− A− α)+ε with ε ≥
0 very small, lower courts can use any de facto AFj,t with j = {c, s} whose distance α from
the de jure AJj,t is lower than α¯ ≡
(
A¯− A)min{1− (1 + 2K)−1/2 , 2K (1 + 3K + 4K2)−1}.
The lower courts’ objective function is (1/2)
(
AFj,t − Aˆi
)2
and they are randomly picked
from the population. This assures that a H (L) lower court uses AˆJj,t − α (AˆJj,t + α) if
AˆJj,t > A˜ = E
(
Aˆi
)
(AˆJj,t < A˜) and sticks to the de jure rule Aˆ
J
j,t if Aˆ
J
j,t ≤ A˜ ( AˆJj,t ≥ A˜)—
see the appendix—with AˆJj,t equal to the Aˆj,t found in section II. This time, the loss of
social welfare is proportional to (1/2) E
(
AFj,t − Aˆi
)2
where AFj is the long run de facto
rule. Introducing discretion entails a cost Θ > 0.
First, let me characterize the equilibrium under Case law. I posit that Case law is
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in its steady state and, in each period, first an appellate judge fixes a precedent and
then a lower court can use discretion. A type i appellate judge not only bears the usual
justification cost, but also cares about the expected distance between the de facto rule in
period t and the bliss point of her own cultural group Aˆi; thus, she maximizes:
− (1/2) E
(
AFc (i)− Aˆi
)2
− (K/2)
(
AJc,t (i)− AˆJc,t−1
)2
,
where E
(
AFc (i)− Aˆi
)2
= V
(
AFc (i)
) − [E (AFc (i))− Aˆi]2. As shown in the appendix,
under the hypotheses on α, the prevailing de jure rule is: AˆJc,t (i) = Γ (K)A
J
c,t−1 +
[1− Γ (K)]
(
Aˆi (i) + α˜/2
)
, with α˜ equal to α (−α) when i = L (i = H). As a result, it
follows that AˆJc,t (L) > E
(
Aˆi
)
, AˆJc,t (H) < E
(
Aˆi
)
and that the de jure rule converges to
the ergodic distribution with mean E
(
Aˆi
)
and variance:[
V
(
Aˆi
)
+ α2/4 +
(
A¯− A) (α/2)] [(1 + 2K)]−1.
Each judge moves AˆJc,t (i) nearer to her own bias in order to counteract the action of a
lower court with opposite bias. Yet, discretion more than compensates this strategic bias,
and AFc (i) equals Aˆ
J
c,t (i) if the lower court’s type is i and Aˆ
J
c,t (i)− α˜ if the lower court’s
type is −i. This not only implies that the de facto rule is unbiased, being E
(
AˆFc,t
)
=
E
(
AˆJc,t
)
+ (1/2) Pr
[
AˆJc,t > E
(
Aˆi
)]
(−α) + (1/2) Pr
[
AˆJc,t < E
(
Aˆi
)]
α = E
(
Aˆi
)
,
but also that its variance is strictly lower than V
(
Aˆi
)
[(1 + 2K)]−1. This means that, pro-
vided that the extent of discretion is limited—α ≤ α¯, the volatility of the prevailing rule
under the pure Common law tradition—i.e., Case law plus discretion in adjudication—is
lower than the one under the mixed system where bright line rules are used. Discretion
will be introduced if Θ < Θ¯—with Θ¯ found in the appendix, while for Θ > Θ¯, the hybrid
tradition prevails. Germany, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries are examples of
this tradition (see footnote 20 and Zweigert and Ko¨tz, [1998]).
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Consider now Statute law, the objective function in (4) rewrites as:
− [(1− µ)/2]
(
AJs + α˜/2− A˜
)2
+ (µ/2)
∑
i∈l
[(
A˜− Aˆi
)2
−
(
AJs + α˜/2− Aˆi
)2]
− 2µΨ.
Given the restrictions on α, the Legislator is always able to foresee the lower courts’
actions and neutralize—in expectation—the use of discretion choosing the threshold
AˆJs (l) =
[
(1− µ) A˜+ µ∑i∈l Aˆi] (1− µ+ |l|µ)−1 − α˜/2.
The expected de facto rule AJs + α˜/2 under the pure Civil law tradition equals the de
jure rule prevailing when discretion is forbidden whether or not bribes are paid. Also, if
biased, de facto statutes are also volatile with variance α2/2. Thus, the pure Civil law
system is retained for every Θ > 0. The following proposition summarizes my findings:
Proposition 5: Let u be unobservable, and α < α¯. The pure Civil law tradition is
always optimal. If Θ ≤ Θ¯ (Θ > Θ¯) the pure (hybrid) Common law tradition prevails.18
From theory to evidence.—Scholars in comparative law have classically considered the in-
stitutional relevance of precedents as a crystallized by-product of the origins’ legal writings
and High Courts’ jurisprudence. The British model of precedent is a case in point. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the runaway of legal positivism over legal naturalism
built the consensus position that, in overruling or distinguishing a precedent, appellate
courts should always consider the hierarchical rank of the court which set it, whether
or not the precedent was chosen per incuriam, and the precedent’s age (see Bankowski,
MacCormick, and Marshall, [1997]: pp. 315-353). These precise and stable factors have
guided the judicial law-making activities of those countries to which the English Case law
was transplanted or that adopted it after independence (Abdesselem et al., 1995: U-107,
18Notice that proposition 1 continues to hold. If α is sufficiently high, the volatility of Case law becomes
higher under the pure system; besides, the heterogeneity threshold under which statutes prevail rises with
α leading to a supremacy of the mixed Civil law system when the extent of discretion is wide enough.
Yet, this uncontrolled use of discretion does not match the procedurally accepted level studied here.
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U-108).19 The German “free law” movement had a similar impact on other non British
models of precedent (footnote 20; Grechenig and Gelter, 2007). Thus, this wide legacy of
legal and historical evidence suggests that K can be considered as country-invariant.
Common law originated from the laws of England and was transplanted through con-
quest or colonization to England’s ex-colonies—e.g., U.S.A., Australia, Canada, and sev-
eral countries in Africa and Asia. Instead, Statute and in general Civil law, as embedded
in the French “Code Civil des Franc¸aise”, brought into force in 1804, and the related
Austrian (1811), Portuguese (1867), Spanish (1889) and Soviet Union (1922) Civil codes
has been exported first to Latin America, Africa and Asia and then to the former Sovietic
republics (see Zweigert and Ko¨tz, [1998]). Differently from these two groups, Denmark,
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland have approved substantive pieces of codification en-
trusting, at the same time, a key role to judge-made law as a key instrument for the
maintenance of those parts of the statutes becoming with time obscure and/or inade-
quate.20 This last experience was especially relevant for some countries—e.g., Ethiopia
and Thailand—which, after independence—mostly in the aftermath of the Second World
War, modelled their legal system on the shape of these European examples.
Starting from the historical features of the transplantation wave, Berkowitz, Pistor,
and Richard (2003) have introduced the distinction between countries that are origins—
19This homogenization was institutionalized in 1833 when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
was entrusted with the power of unifying the action of the Commonwealth appellate courts. Even if
abolished by eight countries in my sample, the Committee’s decisions maintain a highly recognized value
(Abdesselem et al., 1995). Considering only the ex-English colonies as using Case law or excluding the
U.S.A. which use slightly different distinguishing procedures does not affect the main results.
20I coded these countries as using Case law, yet embracing a different strategy does not affect the main
results. Germany and Switzerland are two controversial cases. Yet, “the maintenance of the general
structure of the BGB [German Civil code, 1900] is really the work of courts” (Zweigert and Ko¨tz, 1998:
pp. 153). Courts have relied on the BGB general clauses—number 157, 242 and 826—to adequate the
codes to social and technological innovations. Similar rules were enhanced in the Swiss Civil Code (1881).
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because they have developed their legal order internally—and countries that are trans-
planted—because they have received their legal order either through colonization or by
adoption of the legal tradition considered most advanced at the time. At the same time,
they have stressed the essential randomness of the initial matching between legal traditions
and national legal systems at independence in the transplanted countries. Yet, from inde-
pendence on countries penalized by this match—e.g., culturally heterogeneous ex-Spanish
colonies plagued by inefficient institutions—had all the incentives to reform their institu-
tions toward their ideal legal order—see, for instance, footnote 23: the empirical exercise
takes exactly advantage of this unique historical experiment. Indeed, provided that the
restrictions on the exogenous parameters hold and with K invariant, the model produces
the following predictions on the likelihood of legal reforms in transplanted countries:
Testable Predictions: The likelihood of a reform toward Case and, in general, Com-
mon (Statute and, in general, Civil) law in countries to which Civil (Common) law was
transplanted will increase (decrease) with the degree of cultural heterogeneity and fall (rise)
with the quality of democratic institutions.
IV. Civil Law versus Common Law: Evidence
Next, I will test these predictions, comparing first Statute law and Case law.
IV.A Data and Strategy
I require both a sample of reforms from one to the other law making institution and
proxies for the extent of cultural heterogeneity and the quality of political institutions.
Law-making reforms.—In order to accomplish the first task, I made use of two data
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sources: 1. the first volume of the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law written
by some of the most illustrious scholars of comparative law of the last century—Conard,
David, Von Mehren, and Zweigert—between 1969 and 1995, and listed among the refer-
ences as Abdesselem et al. (1995); 2. the appendix accompanying the Djankov et al.’s
(2003) dataset on legal procedures, which is listed among the references as Acartu¨rk et
al. (2005). I considered as origins Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Russia, Sweden,
Switzerland and, of course, the United Kingdom and, as transplanted, the 156 countries
studied in the above mentioned publications for which enough details on the history of
law-making institutions are reported.21 I observe the law-making process in place in each
transplanted country at independence and in 2000, distinguishing countries using Case
law or Statute law according to the following criterion:22
Definition: A country uses Case law, in a given year, if the decisions of a subset of
appellate courts but not only of the Constitutional court are considered as a source of law
and treated as binding by lower courts. Otherwise, a country employs Statute law.
Next, I can define Statute Ind (Statute 2000 ) as the dummy variable which equals one
if a country used Statute law in the first year of independence (in 2000). Each country
switches at most once. Thus, the long run evolution of the law-making institutions in each
country can be summarized by the indicator Law Making which equals four if Statute Ind
equals one and Statute 2000 zero, one if the opposite is true, three if both Statute Ind
and Statute 2000 equal one, and two if the two dummies both equal zero. There are
21When I restrict the sample to the ex-colonies, the main results remain unaffected. The timing of each
reform is unobserved. Identifying the latter is a relevant agenda for future research.
22A more (less) restrictive criterion is to consider as using Statute (Case) law also the countries in which
only the decisions of a subset of appellate courts (Constitutional-Cassation court) are treated as binding.
If I switch to one of these two alternatives, the main qualitative pattern of the empirical exercise stand.
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ten countries that switched from Statute law to Case law, sixteen that reformed in the
opposite direction, and 60 (70) countries that stick to Case (Statute) law. Switching the
two for the three in the definition of Law Making does not affect the main results.23
Proxying cultural heterogeneity and democracy.—Testing the model’s predictions also re-
quires finding fairly exogenous measures of both the extent of cultural heterogeneity and
the strength of democracy available for the whole sample.
With regard to the former, I make use of two variables. The first captures the cultural
distance between the principal population in the country which chose the law-making in-
stitution and the one in the transplanted country. The second proxy measures the cultural
fractionalization within the transplanted country.24 The first of the two dimensions helps
in clarifying the impact on the evolution of the legal system of the initial inefficiency of
the transplantation match and, in general, of the preference polarization when one group
can completely exploit the other—as in footnote 11 and lemma 4 where Case law does
not converge to optimality.
Yet, creating a meaningful proxy for the cultural distance between populations is not
an easy task. Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1994)—CMP, hereafter—suggest that
an index of genetic distance, the coancestry coefficient—Genetic Distance, is a natural
proxy. CMP justify this claim noticing the strong link between population’s linguistic
roots and Genetic Distance. “Both genetic and cultural contacts [...] take place by the
same routes [e.g., marriage]; they respond to the same geographic and ecological barriers;
23A key example is Mexico that inherited Statute law from the Spanish colonizers but then introduced a
set of “compulsory case law” rules (Abdesselem et al., 1995: pp. M-68) because of the chronic inefficiency
of democratic institutions (Gonzales, 2002) emphasized by the Mexican revolution (1910-1917).
24The main results are essentially unaffected if I use the distance between the principal population in the
transplanting country and that in the transplanted one. More intuitive proxies like the polarization along
the political spectrum or differences in value surveys’ scores are available for a significantly smaller period.
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and they can also reinforce each other” (CMP, pp. 23).25 Besides, looking at European
nations formation, Desmet et al. (2008) have documented a strong relation between a
measure of opinion poll distances based on answers from the section on perceptions of
“life, family and religion and moral” of the World Value Survey and Genetic Distance.
The coancestry coefficient is calculated as the sum of the differences in frequencies of ge-
netic or DNA polymorphisms—situations in which a gene or a DNA sequence exists in at
least two different forms or alleles.26 Gene frequencies change over time mainly because of
migration, natural selection and genetic drift—i.e., random sampling at each generation.
Yet, describing the evolution of selection and the different migration waves is an essentially
unfruitful undertaking. To the latter extent, CMP sampled only genetic markers unaf-
fected by evolution from those aboriginal populations in place before 1500—i.e., before
colonization had fuelled the greatest migration episode in human history. Thus, not only
do higher values of Genetic Distance imply wider genetic differences, but the coancestry
coefficient is both immune to measurement errors and exogenous to all those unobserved
historical patterns which affected cultural fractionalization and political institutions dur-
ing and after the transplantation experience (see also Spolaore and Wacziarg, [2009]).
Data on genetic distance are available for 42 populations groups. Following Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009),27 I matched populations to countries using the labels listed in the ap-
25Building on this intuition, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) use the coancestry coefficient as an
instrument for bilateral trust in trade gravity regressions. Also, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) propose
Genetic Distance as a proxy of family-transmitted characteristics, including cultural and moral values.
26For example, even if the ABO blood group alleles are present in all populations, the frequency of each
allele varies substantially across populations so that the estimated frequency of the O allele is 61% within
Africans and 98% in American Natives. These differences arise for many other genes or DNA sequences.
27The resulting matching is equal to that used by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) except for a few entries—
Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Kenya, Lybia, Malawi, Poland, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda—for which the
histories of demography in the Encyclopedia Britannica suggest different classifications. CS provide a
similar measure of genetic distance—Nei’s distance—which delivers very similar results.
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pendices two and three of CMP and the historical information reported in Encyclopedia
Britannica (2008). The strong connection among genetic pool, socioeconomic distance,
linguistic families and culture described above makes the ethnic and linguistic fraction-
alization in a country a natural proxy for the “within” heterogeneity. The most widely
used measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization is the probability that two individuals
randomly chosen from the population differ in the characteristic under consideration. The
results presented below are based on Av Elf, which is built from 1960 data coming from a
Soviet ethnographic source—the Atlas Narodov Mira (Apenchenko and Solomon, 1964).28
Turning to democracy, I will make use of a proxy for the strength of the constraints
on the executive—Constraint Executive—available from the Polity IV dataset for most
of the countries of the sample starting from 1800.29 Constraint Executive is defined as
the average constraints on the executive over the period elapsing between independence
and the year 2000, ignoring missing data. This index is mainly related to the existence
of checks and balances among different layers of the decision-making process and not on
other Civil liberties, like the rule of law or the freedom of the press. The latter could be
correlated with unobserved country-specific characteristics driving, for instance, also the
population tolerance for different cultural preferences (see Acemoglu et al., [2008]).
Conditional independence.—Yet, as made clear by a recent literature on endogenous
linguistic and ethnic group formation (see Ahlerup and Olsson, [2008]; Michalopoulos,
[2008]), neither Av Elf nor Constraint Executive are immune to several other reverse cau-
sation and self selection biases. This line of research formalizes the intuitions proposed
28The qualitative results are in all similar when I use the linguistic, ethnic and religious fractionalization
indexes proposed by Alesina et al. (2003) or the absolute number of ethnic or linguistic groups.
29Different measures of democracy available for the same period (see, for instance, Vanhanen, [2003];
Marshall and Jaggers, [2004]) deliver essentially similar results.
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by two major theories of social evolution: the primordial and the constructive views.
While the former contends that ethnicity is mostly a primordial by-product of extended
kinship,30 the latter has proposed two more recent factors: 1. the rise of the stratified
society—i.e., the state and the nation with its formal legal order—deprived the extended
kinships of their raison d’eˆtre, pushing for a more homogeneous citizenship; 2. the Eu-
ropean colonizers, instead, pursued a “divide-and-rule” approach in order to increase the
chance of successful exploitation of the colonies (Michalopoulos, 2008). Besides, this lat-
ter exploitation was pursued to different degrees depending on the adaptability of the
colonizer to the climate and to pathogen loads (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
[2001]), which, in turn, affect the species richness as stressed by a large legacy of biology
and ecology research (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2008).31
Therefore, it is not difficult to think of unobserved social and physical factors foster-
ing, at the same time, the extent of unobserved heterogeneity—and, thus, driving also the
reforms of the legal system—and either the preferences for ethnic homogenization or the
quality of political process. In the following, I will first maintain the conditional indepen-
dence assumption; then, I will relax it considering also other biological and geographical
factors which most likely belong to the set of unobserved forces just discussed.
IV.B Statute Law versus Case Law: What do the Data Say?
Empirical strategy.—I need a model for more than two non-ordered alternatives where the
controls do not vary over alternatives. The natural choice is the multinomial logit
30Languages differentiate the members of the extended family from “the others” facilitating the provision
of public good and the preservation of the group physical and human capital (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2008).
31Acemoglu et al. (2001) document that Europeans refrained from developing extractive societies, and set
up efficient institutions protecting property rights only where they were more likely to successfully settle.
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Pr
(
yi = k˜ |zi
)
= exp
(
β′
k˜
zi
)/∑4
k=1
exp (β′kzi), (7)
where yi is Law Making and zi gathers Genetic Distance, Av Elf, Constraint Executive,
the log of the real GDP per capita—GDP—and the population size—Population—averaged
over the 1950-2000 period, and the number of years between independence and the year
2000—Time Independence.32 The latter should crudely proxy for lower switching costs or
stronger preferences for homogenization. Table I (II) reports sources (summary statistics)
of all the controls. Genetic Distance and Constraint Executive are normalized in order to
range between zero and one.
Results under conditional independence.—Panel A of Table III lists the marginal effects
obtained when zi gathers only the cultural heterogeneity proxies. These figures give the
percentage variation in the likelihood of the outcome considered when the control rises
by one percentage point, and they are strongly consistent with the model’s predictions.
A one-standard-deviation rise in the normalized genetic distance—0.29—implies a little
more than four—six in column (3)—percentage point increase in the likelihood of a re-
form from Statute to Case law and a little more than a five percentage point decrease
in the likelihood of a reform from Case to Statute law. Also a one-standard-deviation
rise in the ethno-linguistic fractionalization—0.30—is associated to a three percentage
point increase—1.5 in column (3)—in the likelihood of a reform from Statute to Case law,
and a six percentage point decrease in the likelihood of a reform from Case to Statute
law. The effect of the “between” cultural heterogeneity is definitely stronger than that
32Using the mean of GDP and population over the period 1900-2000 does not affect the analysis.
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of the “within” heterogeneity. Besides, only the former is always statistically significant
at a level nowhere lower than 5%. Finally, a longer spell of political autonomy raises the
likelihood of both reforms while GDP (Population) significantly decreases (increases) the
probability of reform toward Statute law only. This last set of results is common to the
remaining tables and therefore not reported.
Panel B adds to the picture Constraint Executive. Here, the evidence is more mixed.
Stricter constraints on the executive decrease the likelihood of both reforms. In column
(4), a one-standard-deviation rise in the constraints on the executive—0.32—implies a
little less than a seven percentage point fall in the likelihood of a reform from Statute
to Case law and a seven percentage decrease in the likelihood of a reform from Case to
Statute law. Yet, while the first effect tends to become more significant when cultural
heterogeneity is taken into consideration, the second vanishes.
Relaxing conditional independence.—In order to relax conditional independence, I first
require a discrete choice model with eventually endogenous covariates and, then, instru-
ments related to the endogenous controls but not to the unobserved determinants of the
evolution of the legal system. For what concerns the former, I will use the IV probit
with dependent variable Case Law, which equals one when Law Making is equal to four
and zero otherwise. Given the differences in the underlining model, the relative marginal
effects cannot be compared with those produced by the multinomial logit.
More complex is to select reasonable instruments. The primordial theory of social
evolution provides a natural instrument for Av Elf. In particular, Michalopoulos (2007)
argues that, starting with the Neolithic agricultural revolution in the Near East—10,500
BP, heterogeneous land endowments generated region specific human capital, limiting
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population mobility and leading to the formation of localized ethnicities and languages.
This intuition is empirically supported by cross-regional data. Thus, I use an index of
richness of soil types—Soil Diversity—proposed by Ahlerup and Olsson (2008), as an
instrument for the within heterogeneity. The index aggregates qualitative measures of
soil types unrelated to both human intervention and the average quality of the land: this
assures the exogeneity of Soil Diversity to unobserved driving also legal reforms.33
Turning to the quality of the political institutions, a recent literature informed by cross-
cultural psychology studies (Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz, 2007; Tabellini, 2008) has
linked the preservation of the democratic accountability to the emphasis of the prevail-
ing culture on autonomy. “Societies whose cultures emphasize individual uniqueness and
view individual persons as moral equals are likely to develop norms that promote societal
transparency as a means for social coordination [. . . ]. In contrast, societies [that] view
the individual as an embedded part of hierarchically organized groups [. . . ] accommodate
exercise of power from above” (Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz, 2007). Languages are
a key factor constraining the transmission of culture, and Kashima and Kashima (1998)
suggest that a stable role in this diffusion mechanism is covered by the set of rules on
pronouns. Languages that have several second person pronouns modulated according to
the social distance among the speakers instill in the subject the respect for hierarchies—
Second Person. Thus, I use Second Person as an instrument for the long run extent of
democracy; given the very slow evolution of language traits (see CMP), this is a particu-
larly appropriate choice.
33The characteristics from which the index is calculated refers to the texture and mineral components of
the soil: i.e., to the quality in terms of erosion and water retention of a piece of land (Zobler, 1986).
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Table IV reports in the lower panel the first stage results and in the upper panel
the second stage IV probit marginal effects. The figures confirm the evidence about
Genetic Distance and Constraint Executive, and also suggest that the weak significance
of Av Elf was driven by a failure of conditional independence. Indeed, the coefficient
attached to Av Elf is now significant in column (3) at 1 percent.
This pattern is robust to the introduction of other relevant covariates. Recent pa-
pers have proposed that a less unpredictable climate has a negative impact on species
richness (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2008) and a positive effect on the quality of the politi-
cal institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). Column (4) lists the results
when the maximum difference in land altitude—Altitude Diff —is considered; the latter
proxies for more unpredictable climate or higher soil diversity. In column (6), I also test
the Glaeser and Shleifer’s (2002) hypothesis adding a proxy for lower risk of coercion by
powerful elites. The index Economic Power assumes higher values the more diffuse is
the economic power within the population (see Vanhanen, [2003]).34 While the coefficient
attached to Altitude Diff shows the correct sign and is highly significant, the one attached
to Economic Power is significant but unexpected. The pattern could be driven by the
fact that Economic Power is linked to unobserved determinants of stronger political insti-
tutions; yet, this result seems to confirm the doubts on the Glaeser and Shleifer’s (2002)
analysis cast by a recent economic history literature which has been looking at the me-
dieval experiences of both England and France (Klerman and Mahoney, 2007; Roe, 2007).
Finally, the exogeneity test—which is nowhere lower than 0.89 whenever both Av Elf and
34The evidence is in all similar when I use a two stage multinomial logit obtained bootstrapping a routine
that substitutes the fitted values from the first stages to the endogenous in (7). Yet, this model is less
stable than the IV probit due to the lack of sufficient variation in the data. Besides, interaction effects
are usually not significant at a probability of the reform level of 0 and 0.5 (Ai and Norton, 2003).
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Constraint Executive are considered as endogenous—and the first stage R2 confirm the
quality of the chosen instruments. These covariates, moreover, enter into the first stages
in a nice separable form whereby soil diversity affects only the within heterogeneity, and
the lack of individualism only affects the strength of the constraints on the executive.
Given the correlation between Av Elf and Constraint Executive—16%, this assures that
the attenuation bias induced by the variable with the greatest measurement error does
not load on to the other one (see Acemoglu and Johnson, [2005]). Since the first stages
in this and subsequent tables are very similar, I do not report them to save space.35
IV.C Civil Law versus Common Law: What do the Data Say?
Next, I will attack the second set of testable predictions concerning the convergence of
the whole bundle of institutions characterizing the two traditions. I make use of two
data sources: 1. Acartu¨rk et al. (2005); 2. Several treaties, whose list is available
from the Author, detailing the history of the adjudication procedures of the countries
that transplanted the legal order into the nations studied in Acartu¨rk et al. (2005).
Djankov et al.’s (2003) analyze procedural rules governing the adjudication of simple legal
disputes—the eviction of a non-paying tenant and the collection of a bounced check—for
109 countries in 2000. Among other data for procedural formalism, Djankov et al. (2003)
collect the following four dummies which I use as proxies for the lack of discretion in the
adjudication of civil disputes: 1. Appeal l&f 2000 equals one if issues of both law and fact
can be reviewed in appeal and zero if only new evidence or issues of law can be reviewed,
35I obtain mirror results if the dependent equals 1 if Law Making equals 1 and 0 otherwise. Using the
difference in temperature (an index of intellectual power) in spite of Altitude Diff (Economic Power), or
considering the rescaled latitude or a measure of malaria risk, the evidence remains quite similar.
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or if there is not appeal; 2 Judge Law 2000 equals one if judgment must be on law only,
and zero when they may be based on equity grounds; 3. Inquisitorial 2000 equals one if
the evidence gathering procedure can be considered inquisitorial and zero otherwise;36 4.
Written 2000 has value one if the evidence is mostly submitted to the court in written
form—attachments, affidavits, or other—and zero otherwise.
Such rules are consistently (Merryman, 1969; Zweigert and Ko¨tz, 1998; Glendon, Gor-
don, and Carozza, 1999) considered as discriminating among procedures typical of the
hierarchical, inquisitorial and technical Civil law tradition and those of the coordinate,
adversarial and substantive Common law tradition.37 Similar indexes—Appeal l&f Ind,
Judge Law Ind, Inquisitorial Ind, Written Ind—can be built for the first year of indepen-
dence for 98 countries, starting from the history of the civil procedure governing similar
commercial cases in the transplanting country. As in Balas et al. (2008), for each of the
four indicator measured at independence and in 2000, I stack one over the other the ob-
servations for the eviction of a non-paying tenant and the collection of a bounced check in
order to obtain eight indexes with two observations for each of the 98 countries for which
data at independence are available. Next, I build four multiple outcomes indicators simi-
lar to Law Making : Appeal, Equity, Procedure, Evidence. For instance Appeal equals four
if Appeal l&f Ind is one and Appeal l&f 2000 is zero; one if the opposite is true; three
if both Appeal l&f Ind and Appeal l&f 2000 equal one; and two if both dummies equal
36I consider a procedure to be inquisitorial if judges can freely request or take evidence that has not been
introduced by the parties, and refuse to collect or admit requested evidence (see Damas˘ka, [1986]).
37The link with the degree of discretion by lower adjudicating courts can be summarized as follows. While
extensive supreme review and written records assure a credible check on discretionary lower courts;
inquisitorial procedural requirements curbs the parties’ incentive to report noise and contrasting evidence
which calls, in turn, for interpretation of the law (see Damas˘ka, [1986]: pp. 3-6). Finally, an explicit
limitation to equitable judgments is of similar use (see Merryman, [1969]: pp. 123-127).
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zero. Two crucial background hypotheses make this exercise more fragile than the one
discussed above: 1. rules in place in a transplanted country at independence are fairly
well approximated by those in place at the same time in the transplanting country; 2.
the procedure for small commercial cases at independence and the rules governing the
eviction of a non-paying tenant and the collection of a bounced check in 2000 are good
proxies of the underlying “discretion in adjudication” concept.
Recovering legal traditions.—The analysis of these sub-indices generally point in the same
direction. Yet, as Rosenthal and Voeten (2007) point out, this is not a convincing argu-
ment in favor of the approach usually embraced by the “legal origins” literature. Similar
works by Djankov et al. (2003) and Balas et al. (2008) have chosen as study objective the
sum of all the indexes. Such a methodology relies on some untested assumptions which
could be defended only if we had particularly strong a priori about the relevance of each
indicator. Indeed, the methodology assumes that each indicator is equally informative
about the underlying concept, that the employed indicators measure a single dimensional
concept and, finally, that measurement error in the observations is irrelevant (Rosenthal
and Voeten, 2007). Yet, while several scholars emphasize Appeal, Equity and Evidence
(see Merryman, [1969]: pp. 52, pp. 123-127; Glendon, Gordon, and Carozza, [1999]:
pp. 127) as differentiating the two traditions, others (Damas˘ka, 1986; Zweigert and Ko¨tz,
[1998]: pp. 271-272) stress that the defining feature of the adjudication procedures of
each tradition is their adversarial or inquisitorial nature.
To the extent of solving the diatribe, I follow Rosenthal and Voeten (2007), and I use
factor analysis tools in order to model the relationship among Law Making, Appeal, Equity,
Procedure and Evidence and the latent “convergence” construct. Let j = 1, ..., J denote
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countries and i = 1, ..., I summarize the evolution of the considered characteristics of the
legal system. Each observation xi,j is the value for country j on aspect i of its history of the
legal system. If, as scholars of comparative law argue, the degree of convergence toward a
particular tradition was the defining characteristic underlying these individual qualities,
then we have I imperfect indicators of a single unobserved variable. More generally,
the indicators arise probabilistically from a set of I˜ unobserved fundamental historical
aspects with I˜ smaller than I. The analysis is implemented mapping the observed matrix
of indicators X into an I × J matrix of latent variables X∗ with x∗i,j representing the log
odds of country j evolving in the characteristic and in the sense described by i. Next, I
can define the two-parameter multinomial logit item response model:
x∗i,j = βi + ηjλi,
where −βi represents the difficulty parameters, the dummy or “factor” ηj represents
the country specific latent construct and λi the extent to which aspect i captures the
underlining construct. The factor loading for Law Making is constrained to equal 1 in
order to identify the scale of the factor.
Table V reports both coefficients and standard errors of the factor loadings and the
likelihood ratio test that their values do not differ significantly from 1 for a specification
including or not Evidence. The main message is that the latter does not discriminate
between Common law and Civil law countries while all the other indicators are all rele-
vant and equally informative about the underlying “convergence” construct. This result
confirms the key relevance of a preliminary study of the relative importance of each of
the structures that sustain an institutional architecture—in this case, the legal tradition.
Next I define the index Convergence as the sum of Law Making, Appeal, Equity, Procedure
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and, then, the indicator Tradition equal to three if Convergence is weakly greater than
thirteen—at least three indicators equal to four, equal to one if Convergence is weakly
lower than seven—at most one indicator equal to four, and two otherwise. There are sixty
observations equal to three, sixty equal to two, and 76 equal to one.
Results under conditional independence.—An analysis in all similar to the precedent can
be devised: this time, the dependent of (7) is Tradition. Panel A (B) of Table VI lists
the marginal effects when the controls comprehend only the extent of cultural hetero-
geneity (cultural heterogeneity and democracy). A one-standard-deviation rise—0.32—in
democracy implies a little more than a 24 percentage fall in the likelihood of a reform
from institutions typical of Civil law to those typical of Common law and more than a 33
percentage point increase in the likelihood of a reform in the opposite direction in column
(4) of panel B. Cultural heterogeneity, instead, enters often with an unexpected sign; yet,
the relative coefficients are generally insignificant at the usual levels.
Relaxing conditional independence.—This last pattern could be driven by a failure in the
conditional independence assumption. Let me define, this time, Common Law as the
dummy equal to one when Tradition is equal to three and zero otherwise. As columns (1)
- (3) of Table VII show, while the evidence on Constraint Executive remains robust, the
one regarding the proxies for cultural heterogeneity becomes more in tune with the above
model. Both Genetic Distance and Av Elf enter with coefficients that are sometimes
negative and significant; but the one attached to Genetic Distance (Av Elf ) becomes in-
significant (positive and significant) when Economic Power is considered. To this extent,
the model’s failures in describing the impact of cultural heterogeneity over the convergence
of the whole bundle of institutions typical of the two traditions could be simply driven by
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the lack of relevant covariates as, for instance, adequate proxies for the society’s aversion
to discretion, which—as shown above—is responsible of the origin of hybrid systems.
All in all, it is reasonable to summarize the evidence saying that the key institutions
of actual legal systems cannot be considered as randomly assigned but they are the result
of a unique historical shock and of the welfare maximizing choice of the whole society.
V. Concluding Comments
This paper has moved some steps toward a theory of “endogenous legal systems” (see
also Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer, [2008]; and Guerriero, [2008]). I have focused on a
crucial aspect of the design of a legal system, namely the choice of those institutions
that all together can be classified as “Civil” and “Common” law traditions. Rather than
reviewing my results, I highlight several avenues for further research in the field.
My results leave to the applied researcher the key task of rewriting the “legal origins”
literature. In the lights of the actual analysis, the empirical literature on comparative
legal and economic systems should not only consider all the different institutions—i.e.,
law making and adjudication—characterizing the two traditions, but also take care of
the endogeneity of such rules to the level of cultural heterogeneity and democracy in a
society.38 For what concerns the former point, the present analysis also weakens those
defenses of the “legal origins” literature claiming that the La Porta et al.’s (1999) clas-
sification just captures some persistent feature of a legal system possibly shaping their
38These last two forces drive also the performances that we want to explain. Persson and Tabellini (2009)
show the effect of the accumulated democratic capital on the long run level of output. Alesina et al.
(2003) provide evidence documenting the relevance of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as a determinant
of economic success—i.e., output, literacy rate and infant mortality.
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present performances. Not only the law-making institutions switches studied in section
IV.B are not considered by La Porta et al. (1999) but, among the countries studied in
section IV.C, 92% (68%) of the observations coded by La Porta et al. (1999) as having
an English (French) law origin have a value of Tradition of one (three).39 This amounts
to say that these countries have reformed at least three out of the four rules clearly differ-
entiating the two traditions in a direction showing a de facto interest in solving the bias
versus volatility trade off with rules different from those transplanted.
Furthermore, more work should be pointed to understand to what extent legal insti-
tutions constitute an efficiency response to the economic and political environment, and
to what extent they are, instead, long-lasting transplantation constraints left in place by
huge switching costs. As seen in section II.B, if the latter are irrelevant, no difference
among countries in the two traditions should be appreciated, provided that the measures
studied take into full consideration both cultural tastes and technological efficiency.40
All in all, exploring further the selection, evolution and impact on performances of
legal institutions is a crucial but challenging task, which requires both a solid statistical
work and a careful collection of data. Progress on this task will not only advance the re-
search frontier in economics, but also deliver huge gains in terms of quality and quantity
of life to many developed and underdeveloped countries in the world.41
39Also three non Scandinavian countries coded as having some form of Civil law origin (three countries
assigned to the English law group) were using Case (Statute) law over the whole independence period.
40Another key link to be uncovered is the one relating law making institutions and the ex-post degree of
insulation of political leaders (see Damas˘ka, [1986]; Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi, [2004]).
41A completely similar routine should be applied to a related literature focusing on the link between legal
traditions and long-run economic growth, and claiming that, contrary to the incomplete markets intuition
(Coase, 1960), contracting institutions—as driven by “legal origins”—have no first-order effect on long-
run economic growth, investment, and financial development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
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Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Socially Optimal versus Technologically Efficient Rules
For pi > 1, E
(
Aˆi
)
≥ A∗ implies that
(1/2)
(
A¯+A
) ≥ A∗ ↔ Γ (λpi) + Γ (λ/pi) ≥ 2Γ (λ)↔
(pi + λ) (pi + piλ− 2− 2piλ) + λ (1 + λpi) (1 + λ) ≥ 0↔ λ (pi − 1)2 (1− λ) ≥ 0.
Therefore E
(
Aˆi
)
≥ A∗ ( E
(
Aˆi
)
< A∗) whenever λ ≤ 1 (λ > 1). 
Proof of Lemma 1
The distribution of judges’ bliss points has expectation (1/2)
(
A¯+A−
)
and variance V
(
Aˆi
)
=
(1/2)
(
A¯− E
(
Aˆi
))2
+(1/2)
(
A− − E
(
Aˆi
))2
= (1/4)
(
A¯−A−
)2
. By the properties of the AR(1),
Case law converges to the distribution Aˆc = N
(
E
(
Aˆi
)
, V
(
Aˆi
)
(1 + 2K)−1
)
. The comparative
statics with respect K holds by inspection while the one with respect pi is proved by the fact
that ∂V
(
Aˆi
)/
∂pi = (λ/2)
(
A¯−A−
) [
Γ′ (λpi)− Γ′ (λ/pi) (−1/pi2)] > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2.A and 2.B
From (2) and (3) it is immediate to see that the objective function in (4) is strictly concave and
the relative necessary and sufficient first order condition is
(1− µ)
(
Aˆs (l)− A˜
)
+ µ
[
|l| Aˆs (l)−
∑
i∈l Aˆi
]
= 0 (A1)
Then, the unique solution to (A1) is (6) which rewrites for every possible l as
Aˆs ({φ}) = A˜; Aˆs ({L}) = (1− µ) A˜+ µA¯;
Aˆs ({H}) = (1− µ) A˜+ µA; Aˆs ({L,H}) =
[
(1− µ) A˜+ µ (A+ A¯)] (1 + µ)−1 = A˜.
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The equilibrium willingness to pay for each of the last three coalitions are
Wl
(
Aˆs ({L}) , A˜
)
=
1
4
{(
A˜− A¯
)2 − [(1− µ)(A˜− A¯)]2}−Ψ =
=
1
4
µ (2− µ)
(
A˜− A¯
)2 −Ψ = 1
16
µ (2− µ)
(
A¯−A−
)2 −Ψ =
=
1
4
µ (2− µ)
(
A˜−A−
)2 −Ψ = Wl (Aˆs ({H}) , A˜) ;
(A2)
Wl
(
Aˆs ({L,H}) , A˜
)
=
1
4
{(
A˜− A¯
)2
+
(
A˜−A−
)2 − (A˜− A¯)2 − (A˜−A−)2}−Ψ = −Ψ < 0.
Being 2A˜ = A¯ − A− , coalition {L,H} will never pay the fixed cost Ψ > 0 . Therefore, the
Legislator chooses a coalition among {φ}, {L} and {H}:
U
(
Aˆs ({φ}) , A˜
)
= −1− µ
2
(
A˜− A˜
)2
= 0
U
(
Aˆs ({L}) , A˜
)
= − (1− µ) µ
2
2
(
A˜− A¯
)2
+
µ2
2
(2− µ)
(
A˜− A¯
)2 − 2µΨ =
=
µ2
8
(
A¯−A−
)2 − 2µΨ = U (Aˆs ({H}) , A˜)
(A3)
Clearly the Legislator chooses either {L} or {H}—it is strictly indifferent between the two, and
both her utility in favoring one of these two coalitions and the coalitions’ bribing schedules rise
with both µ and pi, being µ2 and µ (2− µ) increasing with µ and ∂
(
A− − A¯
)2/
∂pi > 0.
Thus, for Ψ > 0 sufficiently small, it does always exist a level of pi implicitly defined by
(µ/16) (2− µ)
(
A¯ (p¯i)−A− (p¯i)
)2
= Ψ, such that—as (A2) suggests—for pi ≥ p¯i both groups be-
come organized and for pi < p¯i they remain dormant. Similarly, there is a pi implicitly defined by
(µ/16)
(
A¯ (p¯i)−A− (p¯i)
)2
= Ψ, such that—as (A3) suggests—for pi ≥ p¯i the Legislator chooses ei-
ther {L} or {H}, and for pi < p¯i A˜ prevails. For every pi and µ, (µ/16) (2− µ)
(
A¯ (pi)−A− (pi)
)2 ≥
(µ/16)
(
A¯ (pi)−A− (pi)
)2
: as a result, p¯i ≥ p¯i. From t = 1 on and for pi ≥ p¯i, the loss of social
welfare is
(
µ2/8
) (
A¯−A−
)2
. No group pays a Ψ > 1/16.
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The following comparative statics complete the proof:
(1/16)µ (2− µ)
[
∂
(
A¯ (p¯i)−A (p¯i))2/∂pi] dp¯i − dΨ = 0→ dp¯i/dΨ > 0;
(1/16)µ (2− µ)
[
∂
(
A¯ (p¯i)−A (p¯i))2/∂pi] dp¯i + (1/8) (1− µ) (A¯ (p¯i)−A (p¯i))2 dµ = 0→ dp¯idµ < 0;
(1/8)µ2
[
∂
(
A¯ (p¯i)−A (p¯i))2/∂pi] dp¯i − 2µdΨ = 0→ dp¯i/dΨ > 0;
(1/8)µ2
[
∂
(
A¯ (p¯i)−A (p¯i))2/∂pi] dp¯i + (1/4)µ (A¯ (p¯i)−A (p¯i))2 dµ = 0→ dp¯i/dµ < 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3
The set of possible coalitions is Ω = {{φ} , {L} , {H} , {E} , {L,H} , {L,E} , {E,H} , {L,H,E}}
and A˜ = (1/3)
(
A¯+A− +A
∗
)
. Therefore, for every possible l, (6) rewrites as:
Aˆs ({φ}) = A˜; Aˆs ({L}) = (1− µ) A˜+ µA¯;
Aˆs ({H}) = (1− µ) A˜+ µA− ; Aˆs ({E}) = (1− µ) A˜+ µA∗;
Aˆs ({L,H}) =
(1− µ) A˜+ µ
(
A− + A¯
)
1 + µ
; Aˆs ({L,E}) =
(1− µ) A˜+ µ (A∗ + A¯)
1 + µ
;
Aˆs ({E,H}) =
(1− µ) A˜+ µ
(
A− +A
∗
)
1 + µ
; Aˆs ({L,E,H}) =
(1− µ) A˜+ µ
(
A− + A¯+A
∗
)
1 + 2µ
= A˜.
The equilibrium willingness to pay for each of the last seven coalitions are:
Wl
(
Aˆs ({L}) , A˜
)
=
(µ
6
)
(2− µ)
(
A˜− A¯
)2 −Ψ = (µ
6
)
(2− µ)
(
A∗ +A− − 2A¯
3
)2
−Ψ; (A4)
Wl
(
Aˆs ({H}) , A˜
)
=
(µ
6
)
(2− µ)
(
A˜−A
)2 −Ψ = (µ
6
)
(2− µ)
(
A¯+A∗ − 2A−
3
)2
−Ψ; (A5)
Wl
(
Aˆs ({E}) , A˜
)
= (µ/6) (2− µ)
(
A˜−A∗
)2 −Ψ = (µ/6) (2− µ) [(A¯+A− 2A∗)/3]2 −Ψ;
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Wl
(
Aˆs ({L,H}) , A˜
)
= (1/6)
[(
2µ+ µ2
)/
(1 + µ)2
] [(
2A∗ − A¯−A)/3]2 −Ψ;
Wl
(
Aˆs ({L,E}) , A˜
)
= (1/6)
[(
2µ+ µ2
)/
(1 + µ)2
] [(
2A−A∗ − A¯)/3]2 −Ψ;
Wl
(
Aˆs ({E,H}) , A˜
)
= (1/6)
[(
2µ+ µ2
)/
(1 + µ)2
] [(
2A¯−A∗ −A)/3]2 −Ψ;
Wl
(
Aˆs ({L,E,H}) , A˜
)
= −Ψ < 0.
Coalition {L,E,H} will never pay a Ψ > 0. Thus, in order to identify the winner, it is
enough to compare the Legislator’s utility for the remaining coalitions:
U
(
Aˆs ({φ}) , A˜
)
= 0; U
(
Aˆs ({E}) , A˜
)
=
(
µ2
/
2
) [(
A¯+A− 2A∗)/3]2 − 3µΨ;
U
(
Aˆs ({L}) , A˜
)
=
(
µ2
/
2
) [(
A∗ +A− 2A¯)/3]2 − 3µΨ; (A6)
U
(
Aˆs ({H}) , A˜
)
=
(
µ2
/
2
) [(
A¯+A∗ − 2A)/3]2 − 3µΨ; (A7)
U
(
Aˆs ({L,H}) , A˜
)
= (1/2)
[(
2µ3 + µ2
)/
(1 + µ)2
] [(
2A∗ − A¯−A)/3]2 − 3µΨ;
U
(
Aˆs ({L,E}) , A˜
)
= (1/2)
[(
2µ3 + µ2
)/
(1 + µ)2
] [(
2A−A∗ − A¯)/3]2 − 3µΨ;
U
(
Aˆs ({E,H}) , A˜
)
= (1/2)
[(
2µ3 + µ2
)/
(1 + µ)2
] [(
2A¯−A∗ −A)/3]2 − 3µΨ.
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For every pi, A ≤ A∗ ≤ A¯ then min
{∣∣∣A˜− A¯∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣A˜−A∣∣∣} > ∣∣∣A˜−A∗∣∣∣ which implies that
coalition {L} and {H} will always be preferred to {E}. Thus, it remains to compare coalition
{L}, {H}, {L,H}, {L,E} and {E,H}. The Legislator prefers {L} to {H} if
∣∣∣A∗ +A− − 2A¯∣∣∣ =
2A¯−A∗−A− > A¯+A∗−2A− which is true for λ ≤ 1, while the opposite is true for λ > 1. Notice also
that
∣∣∣2A¯−A∗ −A− ∣∣∣ = 2A¯−A∗−A− , ∣∣∣2A− −A∗ − A¯∣∣∣ = A∗+A¯−2A− , ∣∣∣2A∗ − A¯−A− ∣∣∣ = 2A∗−A¯−A−
for λ > 1 and
∣∣∣2A∗ − A¯−A− ∣∣∣ = A¯+A−−2A∗ for λ ≤ 1. For λ ≤ 1, {E,H} is preferred to {L,H}—
being 2A¯−A∗−A− > A¯+A−−2A∗—and to {L,E}—because 2A¯−A∗−A− ≥ A¯+A∗−2A− . Yet, the
Legislator weakly (strictly) prefers {L} to {E,H} for every µ ≥ 0 (µ > 0) being 2µ+1 ≤ (1 + µ)2.
For λ > 1, {L,E} is preferred to {E,H}—because A¯+A∗−2A− > 2A¯−A∗−A−—which, in turn, is
preferred to {L,H}—being 2A¯−A∗−A− > 2A∗−A¯−A− . Yet again the Legislator picks an extrem-
ist coalition because she weakly (strictly) prefers {H} for every µ ≥ 0 (µ > 0). The Legislator’s
utility in favoring {L} or {H} and the two coalitions’ bribing schedules increase with both
µ and pi being ∂
(
A∗ +A− − 2A¯
)2/
∂pi = 2
(
A∗ +A− − 2A¯
) [
Γ′ (λ/pi)
(−1/pi2)− 2Γ′ (λpi)pi] =
∂
(
A¯+A∗ − 2A−
)2/
∂pi > 0. As (A4) ((A5)) suggests, for λ ≤ 1 ( λ > 1 ), provided that Ψ > 0 is
sufficiently small, there exists a p˜iL (p˜iH) defined by (1/54)µ (2− µ)
(
A∗ +A− (p˜iL)− 2A¯ (p˜iL)
)2
=
Ψ ((1/54)µ (2− µ)
(
A¯ (p˜iH) +A∗ − 2A− (p˜iH)
)2
= Ψ) such that for pi ≥ p˜iL, {L} (pi ≥ p˜iH , {H})
pays the fixed fee and for pi < p˜iL (for pi < p˜iH) it remains dormant. Also, as (A6) ((A7))
suggests, there is a ˜˜piL (˜˜piH) implicitly defined by (1/54)µ2
(
A∗ +A−
(˜˜piL)− 2A¯ (˜˜piL))2 = Ψ
((1/54)µ2
(
A¯
(˜˜piH)+A∗ − 2A− (˜˜piH))2 = Ψ), such that for pi ≥ ˜˜piL ( pi ≥ ˜˜piH ) the Legislator
chooses {L} ({H}) and, for pi < ˜˜piL (pi < ˜˜piH), A˜ prevails. By a reasoning similar to that devel-
oped in the proof of lemma 2, it is easy to see that ˜˜pil˜ ≥ p˜il˜, ∀l˜ = L,H. For pi ≥ ˜˜piL ( pi ≥ ˜˜piL ) and
λ ≤ 1 (λ > 1) the loss of social welfare is (µ2/18) (A∗ +A− − 2A¯)2 ((µ2/18) (A¯+A∗ − 2A−)2).
No group pays a Ψ > 1/27. The comparative statics on p˜il˜ and ˜˜pil˜ are similar to those discussed
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above and, accordingly, omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 2
For λ > 1 the expected losses of welfare under the two rules are equal for 0 ≤ µ˜2H =
[2 (1 + 2K)]−1
{[
6
(
A¯
)2 + 6 (A∗)2 + 6(A−)2 − 2(A¯+A∗ +A−)2](A¯+A∗ − 2A−)−2} (A8)
The difference between the numerator and the denominator of the ratio in the brackets is
6
(
A¯
)2 + 6 (A∗)2 + 6(A−)2 − 2(A¯+A∗ +A−)2 − [(A¯+A∗ +A−)− 3A−]2 =
6
(
A¯
)2 + 6 (A∗)2 − 3 [(A¯+A∗ +A−)2 − 2A− (A¯+A∗ +A−)+ (A−)2] = 3 (A¯−A∗)2 > 0,
so that (A8) can be written as µ˜2H = (1/2) (1 + 2K)
−1
{
1 + 3
(
A¯−A∗)2 (A¯+A∗ − 2A−)−2}.
As a result, the right hand side of (A8) is decreasing with pi because
∂
∂pi
(
A¯−A∗
A¯+A∗−2A−
)2
< 0↔ ∂A¯∂pi
(
A¯+A∗ − 2A−
)
−
(
∂A¯
∂pi − 2
∂A−
∂pi
)(
A¯−A∗) < 0↔
↔ 2λ
(1+piλ)2
(
λ
1+λ − λpi+λ
)
< 2λ
(pi+λ)2
(
λpi
1+λpi − λ1+λ
)
↔ pi + λ < 1 + λpi ↔ λ > 1.
To see why µ˜H = 1 for a KH > 0, notice that ∂µ˜H/∂K < 0 and that for K = 0 the difference be-
tween the loss of social welfare under Case law and the one under Statute law is 3
(
A¯−A∗)2 > 0.
A similar analysis applies to the λ ≤ 1 case and it is, therefore, omitted. In this case, the ex-
pected loss of welfare is equal under the two rules for
µ˜2L = (1/2) (1 + 2K)
−1
[
1 + 3
(
A∗ −A−
)2 (
A∗ +A− − 2A¯
)−2] ≥ 0. 
Accounting for Tastes versus Efficiency
The willingness to pay for {L}, {H} and {L,H} are:
Wl
(
AˆEs ({L}) , A˜E
)
= (1/16)µ (2− µ) (1− T )2
(
A¯−A−
)2 −Ψ = Wl (AˆEs ({H}) , A˜E),
Wl
(
AˆEs ({L,H}) , A˜E
)
= −Ψ.
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Again coalition {L,H} is not willing to pay the collective action cost and the Legislator is
indifferent between {L} and {H}. Both her utility in favoring one of these two coalitions—(
µ2
/
8
)
(1− T )2
(
A¯−A−
)2 − 2µΨ—and the coalitions’ bribing schedules rise with µ and pi. For
Ψ > 0 sufficiently small, it exists a p¯iE defined by (1/16)µ (2− µ) (1− T )2
(
A¯
(
p¯iE
)−A− (p¯iE))2 =
Ψ, such that for pi ≥ p¯iE both groups become organized and for pi < p¯iE they remain dormant,
and there is a p¯iE implicitly defined by (1/16)µ (1− T )2
(
A¯
(
p¯iE
)−A− (p¯iE))2 = Ψ, such that
for pi ≥ p¯iE the Legislator chooses either {L} or {H} and, for pi < p¯iE , A˜E is chosen. Again
p¯iE > p¯iE . For pi ≥ p¯iE , the loss of social welfare is (µ2/8) (1− T )2 (A¯−A−)2. No group pays a
Ψ > (1/16) (1− T )2; besides, the usual comparative statics apply. 
Proof of Lemma 4 and Proposition 3
Being K˜ < 1/8 < 1/2 it does always exist a pˆi
=
implicitly defined by A¯
(
pˆi
=
)
− A
(
pˆi
=
)
=
√
2K˜
such that for pi < pˆi
=
a first period judge selects Aˆc,1 = Aˆi and she is never reversed. In this
case, the loss of social welfare under Case law is (1/8)
(
A¯−A−
)2
. When pi grows over pˆi
=
, the
first period judge can either fix her own preferred threshold—which will be overruled in the
second period—or a compromise that is not overruled by a judge of type −i but could be
eventually be overruled by a judge of type i. Such a compromise is given by A˜− = A¯ −
√
2K˜
( ˜¯A = A−+
√
2K˜)—which rises with pi and it is implicitly defined by
(
A˜− − A¯
)2
= 2K˜ (
(
˜¯A−A−
)2
=
2K˜)—if the first period judge is of type H (L). A second period judge of type H does
not overrule A˜− if
(
A¯−
√
2K˜ −A−
)2
< 2K˜ ↔ (1/2)
(
A¯−A−
)
>
√
2K˜, which is the case for
pˆi
=
≤ pi ≤ ˆ¯pi with A¯ (ˆ¯pi) − A− (ˆ¯pi) = 2√2K˜. At the same time, the first period H judge
will prefer the compromise when (δ/2)
(
A¯−A−
)2
> (1 + δ)
(
A˜− −A−
)2
, which is the case if:
(2 + δ)
(
A¯−A−
)2
+ 2 (1 + δ) 2K˜ − 4 (1 + δ)
(
A¯−A−
)√
2K˜ < 0. The left hand side of this last
inequality is increasing with
(
A¯−A−
)
for
(
A¯−A−
)
> [2 (1 + δ)/(2 + δ)]
√
2K˜, negative for the
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lowest possible
(
A¯−A−
)
in the relevant range—
√
2K˜ at pˆi
=
—and positive for the highest pos-
sible value of
(
A¯−A−
)
—2
√
2K˜ at ˆ¯pi. As a result, it does exist a pˆi− with pˆi= < pˆi− < ˆ¯pi such
that for pˆi
=
≤ pi ≤ pˆi− the first period judge prefers A˜− and for pˆi− < pi < ˆ¯pi she chooses A− . If
pi ≥ ˆ¯pi—which can be the case only if K˜ < 1/8—she always prefers the compromise and being
overruled by a judge of the same type being (δ/2)
(
A¯−A−
)2
> (δ/2)
(
A˜− −A−
)2
. By symmetry,
the same analysis holds true when the first period judge is of type L. The loss of social welfare
is (1/8)
(
A¯−A−
)2
for pi < pˆi− and for pˆi− < pi < ˆ¯pi, (1/2)
[
(1/2)
(
A¯−A−
)
−
√
2K˜
]2
for pˆi
=
≤ pi ≤ pˆi−
and (1/4)
[
(1/2)
(
A¯−A−
)
−
√
2K˜
]2
+(1/16)
(
A¯−A−
)2
for pi ≥ ˆ¯pi. 
Proof of Lemma 5 and Proposition 4
A type {H} judge faced with a type {L} ’s precedent distinguishes to the first best if −K˜I ≥
− (1/2)
(
A¯−A−
)2 ↔ 2K˜I ≤ (A¯−A−)2. By the same token, a type {L} judge faced with a
type {H} ’s precedent distinguishes to the first best if 2K˜I ≤
(
A¯−A−
)2
. Therefore, being
∂
(
A− − A¯
)2/
∂pi > 0 and provided that K˜I ≤ 1/2, there exists a piI with ∂piI
/
∂K˜
I
> 0 such
that every judge finds it worthy to introduce the second dimension for pi ≥ piI . The loss of
welfare under Case law for pi < piI is:
Λ˜
(
Aˆc
)
= (1/2)
(
A¯− E
(
Aˆi
))2
= (1/2)
(
A− − E
(
Aˆi
))2
= (1/8)
(
A¯−A−
)2 ≥ µ2 (1/8)(A¯−A−)2,
∀µ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for pi < piI Statute law is weakly better; for pi > piI , instead, the first best
is achieved under Case law which is therefore strictly better. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Lower courts of type H and L will make use of discretion respectively when:
(
AˆJj,t −A−
)2 ≥ (AˆJj,t − α−A−)2 + 2θ ↔ AˆJj,t ≥ (2α)−1 (2θ + α2)+A− ; (A9)
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(
AˆJj,t − A¯
)2 ≥ (AˆJj,t + α− A¯)2 + 2θ ↔ AˆJj,t ≤ − (2α)−1 (2θ + α2)+ A¯. (A10)
From (A9) and (A10) it follows that a lower court of type H (L) uses discretion if and only if
AˆJj,t > E
(
Aˆi
)
(AˆJj,t < E
(
Aˆi
)
) whenever θ > θ¯ ≡ (α/2)
[(
A¯ (pi)−A− (pi)
)
− α
]
; θ¯ is positive
because α < (1/2)
(
A¯−A−
)
. The objective function of a generic appellate judge i is now:
−Pr
[
AJc,t (i) < A˜
]{[
AJc,t (i)−AJc,t (i)− α/2
]2 + [AJc,t (i) + α−AJc,t (i)− α/2]2}+
−Pr
[
AJc,t (i) > A˜
]{[
AJc,t (i)−AJc,t (i) + α/2
]2 + [AJc,t (i)− α−AJc,t (i) + α/2]2}+
−Pr
[
AJc,t (i) < A˜
] [
AJc,t (i) + α/2− Aˆi
]2 − Pr [AJc,t (i) > A˜] [AJc,t (i)− α/2− Aˆi]2 +
−2K
(
AJc,t (i)− AˆJc,t−1
)2
.
Consider first a type L appellate judge, she will choose an AJc,t (L) > A˜ whenever the first order
condition is met and the corner A˜ is not a solution or
AˆJc,t (L)− α/2− A¯+K
(
AˆJc,t (L)− AˆJc,t−1
)
= 0; (A11)
A˜+ α/2− A¯+K
(
A˜− AˆJc,t−1
)
< 0↔ α <
(
A¯−A−
)
−K
(
A¯+A− − 2AˆJc,t−1
)
. (A12)
Symmetrically a type H judge will fix an AFc,t (H) < A˜ whenever
AˆJc,t (H) + α/2−A− +K
(
AˆJc,t (H)− AˆJc,t−1
)
= 0; (A13)
A˜− α/2−A− +K
(
A˜− AˆJc,t−1
)
> 0↔ α <
(
A¯−A−
)
−K
(
A¯+A− − 2AˆJc,t−1
)
. (A14)
Conditions (A11) and (A13) imply that Case law follows an AR(1) process converging to the
ergodic distribution with mean E
(
AˆJc,t (L)
)
= E
(
Aˆi
)
and variance V
(
AˆJc,t (L)
)
=
(1 + 2K)−1
[
(1/4)
(
A¯−A−
)2
+ α2
/
4 + (α/2)
(
A¯−A−
)]
.
If Case law is mature conditions (A12) and (A14) are always met being α < α¯ <
(
A¯−A−
)
, and
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A˜ is not a solution being A˜ − A¯ < 0 (A˜ − A− > 0) when i = L (i = H). As a consequence,
AJc,t (L) > A˜ and A
J
c,t (H) < A˜. The variance of the de facto rule is V
(
AˆJc,t (L) + ˜˜α
)
—where ˜˜α
is the random variable equal to 0 when appellate and lower courts are of the same type and to
−α (α) if i = L (i = H) and the adjudicating court is of type H (L):
V
(
AˆJc,t (L) + ˜˜α
)
= V
(
AˆJc,t (L)
)
+ V
( ˜˜α)+ 2Cov (AˆJc,t (L) + ˜˜α) =
= V
(
AˆJc,t (L)
)
+ E
( ˜˜α2)+ 2E(AˆJc,t (L) ˜˜α) =
=
1
1 + 2K

(
A¯−A−
)2
4
+
α2
4
+
α
(
A¯−A−
)
2
+ α22 − α
(
A¯−A−
)
2 (1 +K)
− α
2
2 (1 +K)
=
=
V
(
Aˆi
)
1 + 2K
+
α2
(
1 + 3K + 4K2
)
4 (1 +K) (1 + 2K)
−
α
(
A¯−A−
)
K
2 (1 +K) (1 + 2K)
<
V
(
Aˆi
)
1 + 2K
.
(A15)
The last inequality in (A15) is always true being α < α¯ ≤ 2K (1 + 3K + 4K2)−1 (A¯−A−). The
pure Common law tradition is introduced whenever Θ < Θ¯ ≡ (1/2)
[
V
(
Aˆi
)
[1 + 2K]−V
(
AˆFc,t
)]
.
Of course, Θ¯ > 0. If Statute law outperforms Case law
µ2V
(
Aˆi
)
< min
{[
V
(
Aˆi
)
+ α2
/
4 +
(
A¯−A−
)
(α/2)
]
[(1 + 2K)]−1 , V
(
Aˆi
)
(1 + 2K)−1
}
and the condition µ < (1 + 2K)−1/2 has to hold true.
As a result, α <
[
1− (1 + 2K)−1/2
] (
A¯−A−
)
< (1− µ)
(
A¯−A−
)
and the maximum (minimum)
value of the de facto rule when coalition L (H) wins is always lower (bigger) than A¯ (A−) being
AˆFs (L) = (1− µ) A˜+ µA¯+ α < A¯ ≤ 1 (AˆFs (H) = (1− µ) A˜+ µA− − α > A− ≥ 0). 
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Tables
Table I: Variables – Description and Source
Genetic Distance = The genetic distance between the transplanted country and the code/precedents drafter has
been obtained as follows. First each country has been matched to the principal population
set in the relative territory in year 1500 according to the historic information reported in CIA
(2008) and in Encyclopedia Britannica (2008). Next, following the methodology illustrated
in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), I matched each population to one of the macro groups for
which the coancestry coefficient has been calculated by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) in Table
2.3.1.A, page 75. The variable is normalized in order to range between 0 and 1.
Av Elf = Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, approximating the level of lack of ethnic and linguis-
tic cohesion within a country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized) and
averaging 5 different indexes for the 1960. Sources: La Porta et al. (1999) and, for Central
and Eastern Europe, Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Constraint Executive = Data for 1850-2000 in Polity IV. The variable is calculated as the average of constraint on
the executive over the period between the year of independence and 2000 (ignoring missing
data). The original variable is normalized in order to range between 0 and 1. Sources: Polity
IV project, Marshall and Jaggers (2004).
Time Independence = Number of years from independence to 2000, ranging from 0 to 250 (the latter value is used
for all non-colonized countries). Sources: CIA (2008) and Encyclopedia Britannica (2008).
GDP = Log of mean of real GDP per capita over the 1950-2000 period (Chain Method in 2000 prices).
Source: Penn World Tables, Heston et al. (2006).
Population = Mean of total population in thousands over the 1950-2000 period. Source: World Bank (2002),
CIA (2008).
Soil Diversity** = The variable is calculated as 1 - (number of different types listed for each country/number of
grid cells for each country).* Source: G-Econ dataset, Nordhaus et al. (2006).
Second Person = Dummy variable which equals 1 if the number of second person pronouns that might be used
in spoken language varies according to the social proximity between speakers and 0 otherwise.
Source: Kashima and Kashima (1998).
Altitude Diff = Maximum difference in mean grid-cell altitude.* Source: G-Econ dataset, Nordhaus et al.
(2006).
Economic Power = The index of distribution of economic power resources is obtained adding the product of the
value of the degree of decentralization of non-agricultural economic resources and of the share
of non-agricultural population to the product of the family farm area and of the share of
agricultural population. The variable is the mean over the 1918-1998 period and higher values
implies a more egalitarian distribution of economic power. Source: Vanhanen (2003).
Notes * In the G-Econ dataset variables are reported for each grid-cell within countries. Each grid-cell corresponds to an area of
1 degree latitude times 1 degree longitude, which is approximately 100km by 100km.
** The dominant types among 27 possible choices are listed for each grid-cell.
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Table II: Variables – Means and Standard Deviations
Cultural Heterogeneity and Democracy Instruments and Other Controls
Law Making Tradition Law Making Tradition
Sample Sample Sample Sample
(94) (130) (94) (130)
Genetic Distance 0.504 0.442 Soil Diversity 0.787 0.783
(0.288) (0.286) (0.195) (0.215)
Av Elf 0.358 0.320 Second Person 0.723 0.692
(0.309) (0.295) (0.450) (0.463)
Constraint Executive 0.420 0.488 Altitude Diff 1.276 1.496
(0.315) (0.318) (1.203) (1.345)
Economic Power 36.846 37.551
(15.738) (17.409)
Table III: Statute Law versus Case Law - Multinomial Logit
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3)
The dependent variable is the likelihood of a reform toward:
Case law Statute law Case law Statute law Case law Statute law
Genetic Distance 0.153 - 0.185 0.186 - 0.153
(0.052)*** (0.079)** (0.078)** (0.075)**
Av Elf
0.109 - 0.197 0.051 - 0.167
(0.087) (0.090)** (0.072) (0.083)**
Time Independence 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003
(0.0002)** (0.0004) (0.0003)** (0.0004) (0.0003)** (0.0004)
Estimation Multinomial Logit
Other Controls None GDP, Population
Number of Obs. 156 132 132
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.10 0.13
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -161.868 -134.926 -130.801
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The dependent variable is the likelihood of a reform toward:
Case
law
Statute
law
Case
law
Statute
law
Case
law
Statute
law
Case
law
Statute
law
Genetic Distance
0.222 - 0.263 0.195 - 0.246
(0.090)** (0.113)** (0.089)** (0.108)**
Av Elf
0.145 - 0.165 0.105 - 0.098
(0.112) (0.096)* (0.100) (0.088)
Constraint Executive
- 0.253 - 0.371 - 0.157 - 0.377 - 0.321 - 0.197 - 0.227 - 0.240
(0.110)** (0.114)*** (0.087)* (0.122)*** (0.128)** (0.174) (0.112)** (0.166)
Estimation Multinomial Logit
Controls Time Independence, GDP, Population
Number of Obs. 127 127 115 115
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.25
Log Pseudo-Likelihood - 116.556 - 109.082 - 104.775 - 100.049
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors–z distribution–in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
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Table IV: Statute Law versus Case Law - IV Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
The dependent variable is the likelihood of a reform toward:
Case law Case law Case law Case law Case law
Genetic Distance
0.064 - 0.425 0.148 0.126 0.124
(0.175) (0.182)** (0.012)*** (0.046)*** (0.0004)***
Av Elf
0.844 0.160 0.092 0.071 0.087
(0.794) (0.189) (0.008)*** (0.026)*** (0.0000)***
Constraint Executive
- 0.313 - 1.644 - 0.166 - 0.172 - 0.155
(0.186)* (0.143)*** (0.014)*** (0.063)*** (0.0006)***
Altitude Diff
0.034
(0.021)*
Economic Power
- 0.001
(0.0000)***
First Stage for Av Elf
Soil Diversity
0.282 0.291 0.280 0.298
(0.141)** (0.142)** (0.149)* (0.144)**
Second Person
- 0.087 - 0.083 - 0.091
(0.061) (0.062) (0.063)
R2in the First Stage 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45
First Stage for Constraint Executive
Soil Diversity
0.128 0.143 0.106
(0.147) (0.152) (0.143)
Second Person
- 0.275 - 0.280 - 0.285 - 0.267
(0.062)*** (0.060)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)***
R2in the First Stage 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.52
Estimation IV Probit
Other Controls Time Independence, GDP, Population
Endogenous Av Elf Constraint Executive Av Elf, Constraint Executive
Instruments Soil Diversity Second Person Soil Diversity, Second Person
Num. of Obs. 94 94 94 94 94
Exogeneity Test 0.21 0.00 0.98 0.89 0.99
Log Pseudo-Lik. - 20.700 - 13.755 - 12.377 - 11.004 - 10.045
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%;
3. Control variables used in the second stage are also included in the first stage but not reported to save space;
4. In the exogeneity test row the p-value of a joint test of a zero covariance between the two reduced form equations’ errors
and the structural equation’s error is reported.
Table V: Building the Convergence Measure
Law Making Appeal Equity Procedure Evidence
Factor Loadings
1 0.746 0.548 0.691 0.109
(fixed) (0.403)* (0.262)** (0.310)** (0.085)
Likelihood Ratio Test 38.53
(4 degrees of freedom) (0.00)
Number of Units 980 (Level 1) 196 (Level 2)
Factor Loadings
1 0.758 0.543 0.701
(fixed) (0.409)* (0.254)** (0.317)**
Likelihood Ratio Test 3.23
(3 degrees of freedom) (0.36)
Number of Units 784 (Level 1) 196 (Level 2)
Estimation Item Response Model With Multinomial Logit Linking Function–Adaptive Quadrature
Notes 1. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
3. The null hypothesis of the likelihood ratio test is that all the factor loadings do not differ from 1. The relative p-value is
reported in the parentheses.
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Table VI: Civil Law versus Common Law - Multinomial Logit
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3)
The dependent variable is the likelihood of a reform toward:
Common law Civil law Common law Civil law Common law Civil law
Genetic Distance 0.160 0.430 0.122 0.313
(0.161) (0.212)** (0.196) (0.235)
Av Elf
0.217 0.159 0.183 0.048
(0.227) (0.226) (0.256) (0.241)
Estimation Multinomial Logit
Controls Time Independence, GDP, Population
Number of Obs. 196 168 168
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.15 0.18
Log Pseudo- - 173.422 - 155.381 - 150.313
Likelihood
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The dependent variable is the likelihood of a reform toward:
Common
law
Civil
law
Common
law
Civil
law
Common
law
Civil
law
Common
law
Civil
law
Genetic Distance
0.027 0.303 - 0.086 - 0.360
(0.196) (0.214) (0.242) (0.263)
Av Elf
0.025 0.244 0.059 0.135
(0.309) (0.291) (0.350) (0.321)
Constraint Executive
- 0.478 0.551 - 0.466 0.567 - 0.736 0.967 - 0.729 1.016
(0.222)** (0.286)* (0.220)** (0.285)** (0.292)** (0.350)*** (0.288)** (0.338)***
Estimation Multinomial Logit
Controls Time Independence, GDP, Population
Number of Obs. 164 164 148 148
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.26
Log Pseudo-Likelihood - 142.938 - 140.274 - 121.920 - 119.547
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (z distribution) in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
Table VII: Civil Law Versus Common Law - IV Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
The dependent variable is the likelihood of a reform toward:
Common law Common law Common law Common law Common law
Genetic Distance
- 0.056 - 0.353 - 0.056 - 0.088 - 0.172
(0.267) (0.233) (0.272) (0.013)*** (0.211)
Av Elf
- 0.010 0.205 - 0.011 - 0.050 0.012
(0.369) (0.342) (0.339) (0.007)*** (0.001)***
Constraint Executive
- 0.589 - 1.689 - 0.589 - 0.608 - 0.525
(0.241)** (0.212)*** (0.271)** (0.090)*** (0.065)***
Altitude Diff
0.084
(0.012)***
Economic Power
- 0.006
(0.0007)***
Estimation IV Probit
Other Controls Time Independence, GDP, Population
Endogenous Av Elf Constraint Executive Av Elf, Constraint Executive
Instruments Soil Diversity Second Person Soil Diversity, Second Person
Number of Obs. 130 130 130 130 130
Exogeneity Test 0.97 0.00 0.99 0.62 0.99
Log Pseudo-Lik. - 42.427 - 44.317 - 26.614 - 23.403 - 24.753
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%;
3. Control variables used in the second stage are also included in the first stage but not reported to save space;
4. In the exogeneity test row the p-value of a joint test of a zero covariance between the two reduced form equations’ errors
and the structural equation’s error is reported.
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